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Cash transfers, defined as direct transfers of purchasing power from an institution or 
individual to another individual, are an increasingly popular policy instrument both abroad and in 
the United States. This dissertation investigates how two educational interventions utilizing cash 
transfers affect participating students. The first, the Louisiana Scholarship Program, is a 
statewide program offering publicly financed scholarships for low income students attending 
poorly performing public schools to attend K-12 private schools. The second program, the 
Arkansas Academic Challenge Scholarship, is a state financed broad-based merit-aid scholarship 
for students in college within the state of Arkansas. In general, the results presented in this 
dissertation suggest that students using LSP scholarships performed significantly behind their 
counterparts in math and English Language Arts after one year, but did not differ substantially 
from student who did not receive a scholarship on measures of non-cognitive skills or political 
tolerance. In addition, the findings presented here suggest that currently enrolled students who 
barely qualified for an Academic Challenge Scholarship performed no differently after one year 
than students who barely missed the academic requirements, but earned significantly lower final 
GPAs and were less likely to graduate within four years. These differences disappeared after five 
years, suggesting that scholarship recipients may have delayed graduation in response to the 
program. These studies contribute to the literature on school vouchers and college merit-aid 
scholarships by providing the first experimental evaluation of a statewide voucher program on 
student achievement, the first descriptive evaluation of a voucher program on student non-
cognitive skills and political tolerance, and the first examination of the effects of a merit-aid 
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Education is typically viewed in the United States as one of the most important means to 
improve individual economic outcomes (Heckman, 2008) while also developing the nation’s 
citizenry (Dewey, 1916; Gutmann, 2003). Unfortunately, despite numerous proposals to improve 
the quality of education in the US, student performance has largely stagnated over the last 40 
years. While 9 and 13 year olds have made significant gains on the long-term National 
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), math and reading achievement has remained 
stagnate for 17 year olds over the past 4 decades. Similarly, while Black and Hispanic students 
have made slight gains against White students on the NAEP since 1970, achievement gaps 
persist today. At the same time, real current dollar expenditure per pupil has more than doubled 
since the 1970s (Mills, 2013). In addition, while America’s higher education system is generally 
viewed as having played an important role in the nation’s economic success (Goldin & Katz, 
2008), college graduation rates have risen only slightly since 2004 (National Center for 
Education Statistics, 2014). This dissertation presents an investigation of two educational 
interventions—one focused on K-12 education and the other on higher education—utilizing cash 
transfers, defined as a direct transfer of purchasing power from an institution or individual to 
another individual, to address these issues in the K-16 education system. 
Cash transfer programs have become a popular education policy instrument in developing 
nations (Baird, Ferreira, Ozler, & Woolcock, 2013; Baird, McIntosh, & Ozler, 2011; Handa & 
Davis, 2006; World Bank, 2009). Cash transfers can be implemented in two types: unconditional 
and conditional cash transfers. While conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs build in rules for 
program eligibility as well as continual receipt of funds, unconditional cash transfer (UCT) 





studies of CCT and UCT interventions in developing nations using the most rigorous empirical 
methods available generally find positive effects on schooling outcomes. Baird et al. (2013) 
provide a meta-analysis of the effects of CCTs and UCTs on schooling and later life outcomes in 
developing nations. Their work reviews evidence from 35 experimental and quasi-experimental 
evaluations of cash transfer programs, with five focused exclusively on UCTs, 26 on CCTs, and 
four studies comparing the two types of interventions to one another. In general, Baird et al. 
report that UCTs and CCTs significantly improve the likelihood of enrolling in and attending 
school. Moreover, the authors report evidence suggesting that stronger conditions are generally 
correlated with stronger effects among CCT programs. 
Nevertheless, there is evidence suggestive of some tradeoffs between CCTs and UCTs. 
Baird, McIntosh, and Ozler (2011) note that CCT proponents argue that conditions are needed in 
cash transfer programs to address existing market failures that led to the under investment in 
education in the first place. This argument is supported by empirical evidence suggesting 
relatively stronger effects associated with CCTs over UCTs (Baird, McIntosh, & Ozler, 2011; 
Baird et al., 2013; Todd & Wolpin, 2006). In addition, CCT proponents suggest that conditions 
are necessary in order to gain political support from the middle- and upper-classes (Baird, 
McIntosh, & Ozler, 2011). Proponents, on the other hand, argue that UCTs should serve as the 
default because policy designers actually have a poor understanding of how incentives operate in 
CCTs (Baird, McIntosh, & Ozler, 2011). For example, Baird, McIntosh, and Ozler (2011) find 
that teen pregnancy and marriage rates were significantly lower among girls randomly assigned 
to a UCT-style intervention in Malawi compared to girls assigned to a CCT intervention. In 
addition, Benhassine, Devoto, Duflo, Dupas, and Pouliquen (2013) find that simple 





an UCT intervention that was explicitly identified as an educational intervention were no less 
likely enroll in school as students assigned to a CCT program. Thus, while evidence from 
developing nations indicates that cash transfers generally can positively affect schooling 
outcomes, there is evidence that program design can have important—and potentially 
unintended—consequences for program effectiveness. 
Cash transfers are also becoming an increasingly popular policy instrument in K-12 and 
higher education in the United States. Cash transfers have long played a prominent role in higher 
education policy in the U.S. (Dynarski, 2004). Examples include Pell Grants and the G.I. Bill at 
the federal level, state financed merit-aid scholarships such as the Georgia HOPE scholarship 
and the West Virginia PROMISE scholarship at the state level, and privately financed 
scholarships offered directly by institutions. In addition, school vouchers, or publicly financed 
scholarships for K-12 students to attend private schools (Wolf, 2008), have recently begun to 
take on a more prominent role in K-12 education policy. Motivated by low achievement, 
especially among the relatively poor, several cities and states have implemented voucher 
programs in the hopes of improving student achievement by allowing for better matches of 
students to schools as well as improving the general quality of K-12 education systems by 
introducing competitive forces into an otherwise monopolistic system. As of 2013, 12 states and 
the District of Columbia have implemented school voucher programs (The Friedman Foundation 
for Educational Choice, 2013). In all cases, the vouchers are conditional cash transfers, with 
program eligibility determined by a number of requirements such as low family income or 
evidence of a disability (The Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice, 2013). 
This dissertation provides an investigation into the effects of two statewide conditional 





Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP), is a school voucher program offering publicly financed 
scholarships to low-income children in poorly performing public schools to attend K-12 private 
schools. The second program, the Arkansas Academic Challenge Scholarship (ACS), offers 
sizable college scholarships to incoming freshman and currently enrolled college students who 
have met a series of academic-based eligibility requirements. Both interventions fall under the 
broad category of conditional cash transfer programs because of their incoming and continuing 
eligibility requirements.1 
The following pages provide rigorous investigations into the effects of these programs on 
student outcomes. Chapters 1 and 2 first investigate the experiences of eligible students applying 
to the Louisiana Scholarship Program in the first year of the statewide expansion of the program. 
Chapter 1 employs an experimental design to estimate the impact of LSP usage on student 
achievement on Louisiana's state assessments after one year. In contrast with prior experimental 
studies of K-12 school voucher programs in the U.S. which have largely found null or positive 
effects, the results presented in Chapter 1 suggest significant negative impacts for students 
induced to use the scholarship to attend private schools. Chapter 2 compliments Chapter 1 by 
providing a descriptive comparison of the development of non-cognitive skills2 and levels of 
political tolerance among the first cohort of students in the statewide expansion of the LSP. 
Utilizing results from phone surveys administered to a subsample of eligible LSP applicants, we 
                                                 
1 LSP is a conditional cash transfer program due to its eligibility requirements and because 
continued receipt is made conditional on enrollment in the private school. Currently enrolled 
college students were eligible for the ACS if they had been continually enrolled in up to 12 credit 
hours per semester since their initial matriculation and had a cumulative GPA of 2.5. ACS 
recipients would continue to receive an ACS scholarship if they successfully completed 15 credit 
hours a semester and maintained a cumulative GPA of 2.5. 
2 Non-cognitive skills has become a catch all phrase commonly used among economists to 
describe non-academic outcomes (West et al., 2014). Chapter 2 focuses on the non-cognitive 
skills of Grit (Duckworth, Peterson, Matthews, & Kelly, 2007), Locus of Control (Rotter, 1966), 





find no evidence of significant differences between students who received an LSP scholarship 
and those who did not receive a scholarship on any of the scales examined. 
Chapter 3 provides a quasi-experimental analysis of the effects of the ACS on short- and 
long-run college outcomes among students who were enrolled at a Large Arkansas University 
(LAU) during a dramatic expansion of the program in the fall of 2010. In particular, we take 
advantage of detailed panel data on students along with knowledge of the ACS eligibility 
requirements to compare the outcomes of students who barely qualified for the scholarship with 
those of students who just missed the eligibility requirements in a fuzzy regression discontinuity 
design. In general, while the analyses presented in Chapter 3 admittedly suffer from concerns 
regarding statistical power, our models indicate that ACS receipt did not affect student outcomes 
in the short-run but did have significant negative effects on final GPA as well as the likelihood of 
graduating within four years. Nevertheless, our results also suggest that ACS recipients 
eventually caught up to their counterparts, as we find no evidence of significant differences in 
the likelihood of graduation after five years. 
The evidence presented in this dissertation benefits the literatures on school vouchers, 
state financed higher education scholarships, and cash transfers more generally in several ways. 
First, Chapter 1 provides the first experimental analysis of a statewide K-12 voucher program in 
the U.S. In doing so, this analysis offers insight into how school voucher programs may affect 
student achievement when brought to scale. With an increasing number of states implementing 
such large-scale programs, this research is particularly timely. 
Chapter 2 additionally benefits the school voucher literature by providing the first 
examination of the distribution of non-cognitive skills associated with a school voucher program. 





success (Almlund et al. 2011; Heckman & Kautz, 2012; Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004), 
evaluations of school voucher programs have generally restricted themselves to measures of 
student achievement, attainment, and satisfaction. While our results indicate no evidence of 
significant differences between the students receiving and not receiving an LSP scholarship, this 
work nevertheless expands the school voucher literature by providing a first attempt at 
examining the distribution of such skills among participating students. 
Finally, Chapter 3 benefits the literature on state financed scholarships in two ways. First, 
Chapter 3 compliments exiting research by focusing on a program with relatively low eligibility 
requirements. Second, by focusing on students who were currently enrolled in college at the time 
of the program's expansion, as opposed to incoming Freshman, our study represents the first 
attempt to estimate the motivational effects of a merit-aid scholarship on student outcomes that is 
unaffected by any motivational effects occurring prior to enrollment in college.3 
Taken together, the research presented in the following chapters represents important 
contributions to the understanding regarding the effectiveness of cash transfers as policy 
instruments in K-12 education. 
  
                                                 
3 For example, the mere existence of merit-aid scholarships may incentivize students to work 
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The Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP) is a statewide school voucher program, 
providing public funds for low-income students in underperforming public schools to attend 
participating private schools.5 Originally piloted in New Orleans in 2008, the statewide 
expansion of the LSP program in 2012-13 allowed almost 5,000 low- to moderate-income 
students across the state of Louisiana to transfer out of their traditional public schools and into 
private schools at state expense. The empirical evidence presented here examines how the LSP 
has impacted student achievement in the first year of the statewide expansion. 
Our analysis uses the results of the oversubscription lotteries for nearly 10,000 eligible 
applicants to analyze the achievement impacts of LSP as a randomized control trial (RCT). In 
particular, we estimate the effect of using an LSP scholarship to enroll in a private school for 
applicants to oversubscribed lotteries who were induced to attend a private school as a result of 
winning the lottery. Our analysis uses student-level data obtained via a data-sharing agreement 
with the state of Louisiana. 
In general the results presented in this chapter indicate that the use of an LSP scholarship 
to enroll in private schools is associated with statistically significant—and substantively large—
negative effects on student achievement. Specifically, LSP users are found to be nearly a quarter 
of a standard deviation behind their control group counterparts in English Language Arts and 
                                                 
4 This paper was co-authored with Patrick J. Wolf and Jay P. Greene. 
5 The program was initially called the Student Scholarships for Educational Excellence Program 





two-thirds of a standard deviation behind in math. The magnitude of these negative estimates is 
unprecedented in the literature of random assignment evaluations of school voucher programs. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, we define terms 
that are key to our analysis. Then we summarize the existing literature on random assignment 
evaluations of the participant effects of school voucher programs. After that, we provide a brief 
description of the LSP and the lottery process that enabled the experimental analysis. Next we 
describe the data and analytical strategy used to estimate the participant effects of the first year 
of the statewide expansion of the LSP. We then describe the results of our analyses and conclude 
with a discussion of our findings. 
School Vouchers and K-12 Education 
School vouchers are a mechanism by which government resources are provided to 
families that enable them to attend a private school of their choosing (Wolf, 2008). Strictly 
speaking, a private school choice program is only a “voucher” program if the government funds 
the program directly out of an appropriation. Other private school choice programs are funded 
indirectly, through tax credits provided to businesses or individuals who contribute to nonprofit 
scholarship-granting organizations. Such arrangements are commonly called tax-credit 
scholarship programs. Since tax-credit scholarship programs accomplish the same general 
purpose as voucher programs we will treat both types of private school choice programs as 
functionally equivalent for purposes of this study, although we will specify whether individual 
initiatives are voucher or tax-credit scholarship programs when discussing them. 
Although the origin of the voucher idea generally is linked to economist Milton Friedman 
(1955), political philosophers Thomas Paine (1791) and John Stuart Mill (1962 [1869]) 





on the question is an imperative (Doolittle & Connors, 2001). For example, Richard Murnane 
(2005) argues: 
Providing families who lack resources with educational choices makes sense. The 
consequences of attempting to do this through a large-scale voucher…system are 
unknown. Carefully designed experiments could provide critical knowledge. (p. 
181) 
Experimental design is critical in the case of evaluating school voucher programs because 
of concerns about selection bias due to more motivated and able families self-sorting into private 
schools on their own or through access to a voucher. Fortunately, much of the research on school 
vouchers in the U.S. has taken the form of random assignment experiments. 
Prior Random Assignment Evaluations of School Voucher Programs 
Prior rigorous empirical studies of the effects of school vouchers on participants’ 
achievement, though generally modestly positive, have been inconsistent in their pattern of 
results and have yet to produce a scholarly consensus about the impacts of vouchers on students’ 
academic outcomes (Wolf, 2008; Barrow & Rouse, 2008). 
A total of 13 analyses have applied experimental or regression discontinuity design 
(RDD) methods to data from voucher and voucher-type scholarship programs in Charlotte, 
Dayton, the District of Columbia, Florida, Milwaukee, and New York to determine their impacts 
on student achievement. Both analyses of the Charlotte data reported that the scholarship 
program produced positive and statistically significant achievement impacts (Greene, 2001; 
Cowen, 2008). The experimental evaluation of the Dayton scholarship program concluded that it 
produced achievement gains, but only for the African American subgroup of participants 
(Howell et al., 2002). A single analysis of experimental data from an early scholarship program 
in the District of Columbia concluded that achievement gains from the program that were evident 





2006). The congressionally mandated evaluation of the District of Columbia Opportunity 
Scholarship (voucher) Program, established in 2004, reported achievement impacts, but only in 
reading, that were statistically significant at a 99 percent level of significance after three years 
(Wolf et al. 2009, p. 36) but only at a 94 percent level of significance in the fourth and final year 
of the study (Wolf et al. 2013; Wolf et al. 2010, p. 35). An RDD analysis of the tax-credit 
scholarship program in Florida concluded that students near the income eligibility cutoff 
experienced clear achievement gains in reading, but not necessarily in math, if they had access to 
the program (Figlio, 2011). 
Two different analyses of experimental data from the early years of the Milwaukee 
voucher program reached slightly different conclusions, with one reporting that voucher students 
realized statistically significant achievement gains in both reading and math (Greene, Peterson, 
& Du, 1999) and the other stating that the voucher achievement gains were limited to just math 
(Rouse, 1998). Five different analyses of data from the New York scholarship experiment also 
reached somewhat divergent conclusions. One study reported no significant achievement gains 
from the scholarship program, overall or for any subgroup of participants (Krueger & Zhu, 
2004). Two other analyses employing alternative methods for addressing missing data found 
program-induced gains, but only for African Americans in math (Barnard, Frangakis, Hill, & 
Rubin, 2003; Jin, Barnard, & Rubin, 2010). The original experimental analysis concluded that 
African American scholarship students outperformed the control group students on a combined 
measure of math and reading scores (Mayer et al., 2002).6 Finally, Bitler, Domina, Penner, and 
                                                 
6 Nevertheless, as Peterson and Howell (2004) note, Krueger and Zhu’s insignificant subgroup 
findings appear to be driven in part by the particularly unique way in which they chose to 





Hoynes (2013) examine using quantile analysis if effects differed across the achievement 
distribution, finding little evidence of heterogeneous effects. 
Since the pattern of results from previous experimental and RDD evaluations of voucher 
programs has ranged from neutral to positive, with no statistically significant negative impacts of 
vouchers on student achievement having been reported to date, our operating hypothesis is that 
the LSP will have a positive impact on student achievement. 
Description of the Intervention 
The Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP) is a statewide school voucher program 
available to moderate- to low-income students in low-performing public schools across the state 
of Louisiana. Student eligibility for the scholarship program is determined by family income—
which must not exceed 250 percent of the federal poverty line—and where the student previously 
attended public school. Income-eligible students must have attended a public school that was 
graded C, D, or F for the prior school year; be entering kindergarten; or have been previously 
enrolled in the Recovery School District in order to be fully eligible for the program. In the 
program’s first year, 9,809 students were deemed to be fully eligible applicants, with a majority 
of them located outside of Orleans parish. 
The LSP was created by Act 2 of the 2012 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature 
and Senate. Act 2 requires the state board to allocate the funds for the program annually from the 
minimum foundation program. The voucher size is the lesser of the amount allocated to the local 
school system in which the student resides or the tuition charged by the participating private 
school that the student attends. Average tuition at participating private schools ranges from 
$2,966 to $8,999, with a median cost of $4,925, compared to an average total minimum 





Private schools that wish to participate in the program must go through a screening 
process and schools that do not meet the required participation criteria are declared ineligible to 
participate in the program. There are four areas that are evaluated for determining school 
eligibility: (1) enrollment; (2) financial practice; (3) student mobility; and (4) health, safety and 
welfare of students. In the 2012-13 school year, only a third of eligible private schools 
participated in the program (Kisida, Wolf, & Rhinesmith, 2013). A recent survey of participating 
and non-participating private schools in Louisiana suggests that the program’s regulatory barriers 
have strongly influenced schools’ choices to participate (Kisida, Wolf, & Rhinesmith, 2013). 
Research Methodology 
Experimental Design 
When the LSP was expanded to a statewide program in 2012, the Louisiana Department 
of Education also changed the lottery process determining scholarship awards. While the original 
application process in the New Orleans pilot version of the LSP allowed families to submit the 
name of only one private school for admission, the revised application process allowed 
individuals to offer up to five private school preferences. This difference was the result of 
switching to a lottery process similar to the deferred acceptance lotteries used in New York City 
to assign students to schools through the city’s public school choice program (see 
Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, & Roth, 2005). The deferred acceptance algorithm is designed to 
encourage families to reveal their true school preference rankings and thereby reduce the 
likelihood of gaming. 
While it is not the case that all eligible LSP applicants were awarded scholarships 
through a lottery process in the 2012-13 school year, we can isolate cases in which lotteries 





Specifically, eligible LSP applicants were allowed to submit up to five private school 
preferences and the LSP lottery algorithm attempted to place students into schools while taking 
into account several lottery priorities. First, students with disabilities and “multiple birth 
siblings”7 are manually awarded LSP scholarships if there is available space at their given school 
preference. Remaining students are grouped into one of six priority categories: 
 Priority 1 - Students who received LSP scholarships in the prior school year who are 
applying to the same school 
 Priority 2 - Siblings of Priority 1 awardees in the current round 
 Priority 3 - Students who received LSP scholarships in the prior school year who are 
applying to a different school 
 Priority 4 – New applicants who attended public schools that received a “D” or “F” 
grade in Louisiana’s school accountability system at baseline 
 Priority 5 – New applicants who attended public schools that received a “C” grade in 
Louisiana’s school accountability system at baseline 
 Priority 6 – New applicants who are applying for kindergarten placements 
The LSP award process is summarized in Figure 1. The process begins by attempting to 
place all Priority 1 category students into their first choice school. The algorithm first groups 
Priority 1 students applying to the same school and grade combination and then checks the 
number of available seats for that grouping. If there are more seats than applicants, all students 
receive an LSP scholarship. If there are no seats available, no students in the given group receive 
a scholarship. Finally, if there are more applicants than seats, students are awarded LSP 
                                                 





scholarships through a lottery. Once the process is complete for all Priority 1 students, the 
algorithm attempts to place Priority 2 students into their first choice school. After cycling 
through all remaining priority categories, the LSP algorithm attempts to place students who have 
yet to receive a scholarship in their second choice schools. The LSP algorithm continues until all 





























Figure 1. The Louisiana Scholarship Program award allocation process for the 2012-13 school 
year. This figure illustrates the iterative process used to allocate LSP scholarships to students. In 
addition, this figure highlights the fact that only a subset of students was awarded LSP 
scholarships via lotteries. Our analysis focuses on isolating lotteries for one’s first choice school. 
It is important to note that only a subset of eligible applicants were awarded or not 
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categories one through six whose school-grade combination had more applicants than available 
seats participated in a lottery. Fortunately, using data on student characteristics and school 
preferences, we can identify the subset of eligible applicants who experienced a lottery process.8 
We will focus on this subset of lottery participants to estimate the effects of the LSP on student 
achievement after one year of program participation because these are the only applicants for 
whom LSP scholarship award was randomly determined.9 
Data Description 
Most of the data for this study come from student-level datasets provided by the 
Louisiana Department of Education (LDE) in compliance with our data agreement with the state. 
The LDE had provided us with their: 
 Student Information Systems (SIS) files for 2011-12 (“Baseline”) and 2012-13 (“Year 1 
Outcome”) which includes data on student enrollment and demographic background; 
 LSP eligible applicant file, which includes information on the school choice sets of all 
eligible applicants as well as the results of the 2011-12 placement lottery; 
 State assessment files for the 2011-12 and 2012-13 school years, which include data on 
each student’s participation in the annual accountability assessments and their scores. 
The LDE also provided information on participating public and private schools, and this 
information is supplemented with publicly available data from the National Center for Education 
                                                 
8 We infer that a lottery has occurred when the LSP award percentage is between 0 and 100 
percent for a given school preference by grade by priority category combination. For example, if 
60 percent of Priority 1 category students applying to third grade at school “A” as their first 
choice school actually received scholarships, we assume that all students in that combination 
were subject to a lottery. 
9 After accounting for student testing, demographic, and school data while also limiting our 
analysis to students in binding lotteries, approximately 7 percent of the analytical sample were in 
Priority Category 1, less than 1 percent were in Priority Category 3, 74 percent were in Priority 






Statistics (NCES) Common Core of Data (CCD) and Private School Universe Survey (PSS) 
when necessary. 
The Louisiana state accountability system places a strong emphasis on test-based 
accountability, with standardized assessments offered in most grades—including alternative 
assessments, end-of-course exams, and exams measuring college-readiness. The participant 
effects portion of this study uses student performance on the Louisiana state assessments in 
grades three through eight as our primary outcome measure of interest.10 All students 
participating in the LSP are required to be tested by their private schools, using the state 
accountability assessments, for any grade in which the public school system also tests its 
students. 
Students in Louisiana who are not classified as having a special need that qualifies them 
for alternative programs take one of two state assessments in grades three through eight. In 
grades four and eight, students take the Louisiana Educational Assessment Program (LEAP) 
exams, a series of criterion-referenced tests aligned with Louisiana’s state standards for the 
subjects of math, English language arts, science, and social studies. In the remaining grades, 
students take the Integrated Louisiana Educational Assessment Program (iLEAP) exams, a series 
of hybrid exams including both criterion-referenced and norm-referenced test items in the same 
subjects as the LEAP exams. Performance on both sets of exams ranges between a minimum 
possible score of 100 and a maximum possible score of 500. All exams are scaled with means of 
                                                 
10 Our initial investigations of the test databases revealed 391 eligible LSP applicants in tested 
grades with missing testing data at baseline and 516 observations  in year 1. These observations 
represent approximately 10 and 15 percent of the eligible LSP applicants in relevant grade ranges 
for these years. Further investigation revealed that 82 of the missing observations took the 
Louisiana alternative assessments at baseline and 115 took them in year 1. Given our 
requirements for baseline equivalence, all records with missing baseline testing data are excluded 





300 and standard deviations of 50 (Louisiana Department of Education, 2013a; 2013b). Rather 
than rely on these scale score values, which differ across grades by design, our analysis is 
primarily based on standardized values of individual LEAP and iLEAP performance.11 While the 
LEAP and iLEAP item differences introduce noise into our model, the fact that both treatment 
and control students in a particular grade take the same exam (either LEAP or iLEAP), and our 
inclusion of prior achievement on the right-hand side of the model, should reduce the likelihood 
of bias due to these test differences. 
There are a small number of eligible LSP applicants with duplicate records in the baseline 
(12 duplicate pairs) and year 1 testing data (42 duplicate pairs). When possible, we have resolved 
duplicates by keeping records with the most complete data on LSP participants. For the 
remaining observations, we have randomly kept one record and dropped the other. These records 
represent less than 1 percent of the LSP applicants in both years. 
In addition to individual performance outcomes, the state-provided assessment data files 
include information on student demographics as well as participation in school programs such as 
the free- and reduced-price lunch (FRL) program and special education program enrollments. 
Our analysis includes these baseline covariates in order to improve effect estimate precision.12 
Sample Selection Process 
The student-level data provided by the LDE indicate an initial sample of 9,809 eligible 
LSP applicants in the first year of the statewide expansion of the program. Of these, 5,777 
                                                 
11 Values have been standardized within grade and year based on the observed means and 
standard deviations for control group members on the ELA and math portions of the iLEAP and 
LEAP. 
12 A single individual in our final analysis sample has missing data for their gender status as 
baseline (2011-12). We have updated this individual’s gender status using their reported gender 
in the 2012-13 assessment data. After making this substitution, all records in our final analysis 





students received LSP scholarship placements in a specific private school and 4,038 did not 
receive a voucher-supported placement. Our analysis relies on a non-random sample of this 
original population comprised of eligible applicants with baseline testing data in grades three 
through seven who did not list a special education exclusion on their application and who were 
not multiple birth siblings. Of the 2,897 observations meeting these criteria, we identify 1,908 
individuals as participating in LSP scholarship lotteries. Of these, 727—or 38 percent—won LSP 
scholarships. 
Analytical Strategy 
This section outlines the empirical strategy we use to estimate the impacts of LSP 
scholarship usage on student achievement after two years. We begin with a description of our 
primary analyses, which use the results of eligible applicants’ first school choice lotteries to 
estimate the impact of LSP scholarship usage on student achievement in a two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) framework. We then outline a series of subgroup analyses conducted to examine 
possible effect heterogeneity of the LSP scholarship program. 
Local Average Treatment Effect estimation. As Bloom and Unterman (2014) note, 
because students can participate in multiple lotteries in a deferred-acceptance award process, the 
traditional intent-to-treat estimator has limited policy relevance.13 Instead, we intend to estimate 
the impact of LSP scholarship usage on student achievement—also known as the Local Average 
Treatment Effect (LATE) (Angrist & Pischke, 2009, Cowen, 2008)—by using the result of one’s 
first choice school lottery as an instrumental variable to predict scholarship usage in a 2SLS 
framework. The lottery is the ideal instrumental variable as the high placement take-up rate for 
this program ensures that it is will be a strong predictor of private schooling while the random 
                                                 
13 For example, a student who loses her first lottery can still win an LSP scholarship to her 





nature of the lottery process assures that scholarship receipt is uncorrelated with the error term. 
In addition, because students could only receive a chance to use an LSP scholarship to enroll in a 
private school through the lottery, we can be confident that the variable only influences student 
outcomes through the private schooling that it enables. 
Specifically, we use the following 2SLS model to estimate the effects of LSP scholarship 
usage on student achievement after two years: 
1. 𝐸𝑖 = ∑𝜋𝑗𝑅𝑗𝑖 + 𝛿𝑇𝑖 + 𝑿𝜷 + 𝑢𝑖 
2. 𝑌𝑖 = ∑𝛼𝑗𝑅𝑗𝑖 + 𝜏𝐸?̂? + 𝑿_𝒊𝜸 + 𝜖𝑖 
Where i denotes student and j denotes lottery: 
 E is a variable indicating the number of years a student used an LSP to enroll in a private 
school14 
 R_i is a fixed effect for a student’s first choice school lottery15 
 T_i is a variable indicating if a student received an LSP scholarship to their first choice 
school 
 Y_i is student standardized math or English Language Arts achievement in year 1 of the 
program (2012-13)16 
                                                 
14 Although some prior studies have used “ever attended private school” (Wolf et al., 2010, 
Appendix D) or “consistently enrolled in private school” (Mayer et al., 2002) as the endogenous 
treatment “dosage” variable instrumented for, we follow the approach used by Rouse (1998) and 
employ the lottery to instrument for total years of private schooling as a more global and precise 
treatment dosage measure. 
15 We include a fixed effect for first school choice lottery to account for differing probabilities of 
success across lotteries (Gerber & Green, 2012). By using fixed effects, we are essentially 
comparing lottery winners and losers within the same strata to calculate unbiased estimates of the 
effect of being randomly offered an LSP scholarship. The approach is comparable to analyzing 
the impact of hundreds of “mini-experiments” and aggregating the results across them. 
16 Student achievement scores are standardized using distributional parameters of outcomes from 





 X_i is a vector of student characteristics—including achievement—collected at baseline 
(2011-12) 
The 2SLS procedure first uses one’s treatment status to predict the number of years they 
will actually use a scholarship; and then uses this predicted value to provide an unbiased LATE 
effect estimate (?̂?) for the program. It is important to note that the proposed method instruments 
for LSP usage using the result of one’s first choice school lottery outcome (T). This implies that 
the 2SLS procedure will effectively treat students who lose their first choice lottery but go on to 
win an LSP to a lower school preference as control-group cross overs (Bloom & Unterman, 
2014). 
In addition, it is important to note that there are at least two types of nesting in the LSP 
data that can lead to biased inference (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). First, members of both the 
treatment and control group are nested within schools in the first year of the program analysis. 
Second, observations can be nested within family units, with the potential for several children 
participating from the same family.17 This was also the case in the evaluation of the Opportunity 
Scholarship Program (OSP) in Washington, DC, in which researchers used standard errors 
clustered at the family level to account for error-covariance (Wolf et al., 2013). Unfortunately, 
the results presented here do not account for these types of nesting due to the complex nature of 
multi-level clustering. Instead, we currently only account for nesting of observations within risk 
set.18 We intend to address this issue in future versions of this research. 
Given our dataset, there are two broad methods available to account for non-response 
bias: employing non-response weights or making assumptions about the nature of non-response 
                                                 
17 Approximately 23 percent of individuals in our final analytical sample have siblings that also 
appear in the sample. 
18 Clustering on risk set should capture a large amount of the nesting of individuals within 





to estimate bounds around the program’s true effect (Gerber & Green, 2012). Nonresponse 
weights effectively reweight the data to allow respondent values to account for the values of non-
respondents (Kreuter & Valliant, 2007). Nevertheless, it is important to note that nonresponse 
weights do not account for potential unobservable forces that may be driving patterns of 
nonresponse. If, for example, those in the control group with higher expected outcomes both in 
public and private school leave the sample with higher probability, our LATE estimates will be 
positively biased. Given the likelihood that the observed control non-response reflects potential 
selection effects, we prefer instead to estimate the degree to which attrition affects our estimates 
via a bounding exercise (Angrist, Bettinger, Kremer, 2006; Lee, 2009). Specifically, if we 
assume that the causes of missing data are monotonic19, we can estimate an upper and lower 
bound for the LSP effect by omitting a portion of the control group from the data in order to 
balance non-response probabilities among treated and controls. While our primary estimates of 
the effects of LSP scholarship usage on student achievement after one year do not account for 
differential attrition, we include as a robustness check estimates based on the bounding exercises. 
In general, the results from our bounding analyses do not suggest that differential attrition has 
strongly influenced our primary LATE estimates. 
Subgroup analysis. In addition to examining overall program impacts, we examine the 
extent to which LSP program effects differ across different subgroups. In particular, we examine 
if there are differential impacts experienced for three subgroups: (1) males relative to females, 
(2) African American participants compared to all other program participants, and (3) New 
                                                 
19 The monotonicity assumption requires that treatment assignment influences data missingness 
in one unique direction (Gerber & Green, 2012). This assumption seems plausible in our case, as 
we are most concerned with sample attrition resulting from control group students attending 
private schools on their own accord and it is highly unlikely that a student who won a 





Orleans participants compared to other participants. The first two subgroup analyses are 
motivated by prior evaluations of school choice programs, which have found differential effects 
by gender and ethnicity groups.20 The final subgroup comparison is motivated by the strong 
existing market for school choice in New Orleans in comparison with the rest of the state. In 
addition to having a pilot version of the LSP in place since 2008, New Orleans has a thriving 
charter school market and a history of public school choice (Cowen Institute, 2013). As such, it 
is highly likely the experiences of LSP participants in New Orleans are substantially different 
than other participants; and we should therefore examine the extent to which these differences 
translate into our estimated program effects. 
Finally, in addition to the subgroup analyses described, we examine if there are 
heterogeneous treatment effects by baseline achievement category. Unfortunately, we are unable 
to use the same analytical strategy to estimate performance subgroup effects using the interaction 
models outlined above while also controlling for baseline achievement. Instead, we run our 
primary regression models on three separate subgroups of students: those in the bottom third of 
the baseline achievement distribution, those in the middle third, and those in the top third. While 
this method does not allow for a statistical test of the differences between the estimated treatment 
effects across the three models, it does provide descriptive insight into the extent to which 
students in different parts of the achievement distribution experienced the program differently.21 
                                                 
20 Analyses of the New York Scholarship Program have found significant effects for African 
Americans, but insignificant effect estimates overall (Mayer et al., 2002; Barnard et al., 2003; 
Chingos & Peterson, 2013). Similarly, Wolf and colleagues (2013) report significant 
improvement in reading for female participants in the DC OSP evaluation, but no significant 
differences for males. 
21 Bitler and colleagues (2013) focus on differences in treatment effects across the achievement 
distribution associated with the New York City School Choice Scholarships Program. The results 






Before moving on to our primary analyses, we examine two features of the data that have 
implications for our analysis. First, we examine the extent to which treatment assignment is 
correlated with school enrollment by looking at school enrollments for lottery winners and 
losers. Next, we examine the extent to which the lottery process resulted in covariate balance at 
baseline for our analysis sample. 
Scholarship Usage 
While eligible applicants were randomly assigned to receive or not receive an LSP 
scholarship with private school placement, participating families are not required to use the 
scholarship to attend their designated school. Lottery winners, for example, could choose to 
attend traditional public schools or charter schools rather than use their scholarship offer to 
attend the private school in which they were placed by the lottery. Lottery losers, on the other 
hand, could choose to attend charter schools or elect to enroll in private schools without a 
scholarship in addition to attending a traditional public school. 
Table 1 describes the patterns of enrollment for students who received and did not receive 
LSP scholarships to their first choice schools in the first year of the analysis. It should be noted 
that, because our LATE analysis focuses on the results of first choice school lotteries, the control 
group includes both students who were never awarded a scholarship and students who received a 
scholarship to one of their remaining school preferences. The latter group, who account for the 
60 control group members appearing in private schools in 2012-13, are effectively treated as 
control-group crossovers in our LATE analysis. 
The results in Table 1 indicate that the majority of lottery winners used their scholarships 





public sector schools. In addition, it appears that control group contamination should not strongly 
impact our analysis, as only 5 percent of students who did not receive a scholarship to their first 
choice school are identified as enrolled in private schools in 2012-13. Nevertheless, it is also 
important to note that over 10 percent of lottery losers do not appear in our testing data in year 1. 
In contrast, only 5 percent of lottery winners are missing year 1 outcome data. These missing 
outcome observations could represent control-group crossovers attending private schools or 
students that moved out of Louisiana in the 2012-13 school year. Unfortunately, our reliance on 
the state testing data does not allow us to distinguish the causes behind these missing data. 
Table 1 
Year 1 Enrollment Patterns by Scholarship Award 
 
Treatment Group  Control Group 
Total 
Received Scholarship to 
First Choice School 
 
Did Not Receive 
Scholarship to First Choice 
School 
N %  N % 
Private School 550 76%  60 5% 610 
Public School 143 20%  1,005 85% 1,148 
Unknown School 34 5%   116 10% 150 
Total 727 100%   1,181 100% 1,908 
Notes. Sample represents all students with baseline testing data in grades three through seven who did not list a 
special education exclusion on the LSP application and who were not identified as multiple birth siblings. For 
students in the treatment group attending public schools, 72 percent attended a traditional public school, 25 percent 
attended a charter school, and 3 percent attended a magnet school. The corresponding percentages for the control 
group members attending a public school are: 74 percent attended a traditional public school, 16 percent attended a 
charter school, and 9 percent attended a magnet school. 
Source. Authors’ calculations. 
Finally, it should be noted that our outcome data response rate of nearly 90 percent 
overall for the analytic sample is much higher than the outcome response rate for any previous 
experimental evaluation of a voucher program, giving us some confidence that any nonresponse 
bias is trivial. Nevertheless, the differential rates of non-response between the treatment (5 
percent) and control (10 percent) groups are concerning (What Works Clearinghouse, 2014). 





differential attrition biases our results using two separate bounding procedures. In general, the 
results of these analyses do not suggest the estimated results are substantially influenced by 
differential attrition. 
Baseline Equivalence 
The final step required before moving on to our empirical analysis of the participant 
effects of the statewide expansion of the LSP is to analyze the extent to which the LSP lottery 
process actually ensured independence of assignment to the treatment and control groups. While 
we cannot know the extent to which members of the treatment and control group differ on 
unobservable characteristics, we can get a good idea of the success of the lottery process by 
examining if there is baseline equivalence in observable characteristics between lottery winners 
and losers. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 2, which provides the results of t-
tests for differences in means on key baseline covariates between members of the treatment and 
control groups included in our analysis sample, with p < .10 as the lowest threshold of statistical 
significance.22 
The results presented in Table 2 are favorable for our analysis, as nearly all of the 
estimated differences between lottery winners and losers are statistically insignificant, suggesting 
that we have adequately identified lotteries in our analytical sample. The sole exception is that 
lottery winners provided significantly fewer school preferences on average than lottery losers.23 
  
                                                 
22 All analyses include fixed effects for one’s first school choice lottery to account for different 
probabilities of selection. 
23 While our primary models do not explicitly account for these differences, we perform a series 
of robustness checks examining the extent to which our findings are sensitive to the number of 
school choices offered. In general, the estimated effects in models controlling for the number of 















Female 0.51 0.51 0.00 0.99 
Race/Ethnicity     
   African American 0.90 0.91 -0.01 0.57 
   Hispanic 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.40 
   White 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.97 
   Other 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.70 
Free-or-Reduced Price Lunch 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.93 
Limited English Proficiency 0.86 0.87 -0.01 0.47 
Number of School Preferences Listed 2.14 2.32 -0.18*** <0.01 
Standardized Performance†     
   ELA Scale Score -0.38 -0.37 -0.02 0.71 
   Math Scale Score -0.41 -0.46 0.05 0.30 
   Science Scale Score -0.50 -0.51 0.00 0.94 
   Social Studies Scale Score -0.42 -0.42 0.00 0.98 
*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10 
† Scores are standardized within grade based on the observed distributions of scale scores across Louisiana. 
Notes. The analysis sample excludes students with disabilities, multiple birth siblings, and individuals without 
baseline testing data in grades three through seven. All analyses include fixed effects for one’s first school choice 
lottery.  
Source. Authors’ calculations. 
Results 
This section presents the results of our preliminary analyses of the first year impacts of 
the statewide expansion of the LSP on student achievement. 
Primary Estimates of the Impact of Using an LSP on Student Achievement 
The primary results of our preliminary LATE analyses are presented in Table 3. Columns 
(1) through (3) present the results based on ELA performance and columns (4) through (6) 
present the results for math. In addition, it should be noted that the results from the first stage 





LSP scholarship receipt is highly predictive of usage.24 These findings support our claim that our 
results represent unbiased estimates of the effect of LSP scholarship usage on student 
achievement after one year. 
In general, LSP scholarship users are found to score significantly worse than their control 
group counterparts on the state’s ELA and math exams. In particular, students who used an LSP 
scholarship to enroll in private schools are found to score about a quarter of a standard deviation 
behind their control group counterparts in ELA achievement and over a two-thirds of a standard 
deviation behind in math per year of private school attendance.25 These estimates are statistically 
significant, substantial, and unprecedented in the literature. 
The performance of the baseline covariates in the regressions provides us with some 
confidence that the estimation of the voucher impact is valid and reliable. Students’ baseline 
achievement scores are highly predictive of their outcome scores, at a level comparable to or 
even better than those observed in previous analyses (e.g. Howell et al., 2002). Female students 
outperformed males, in both ELA and math, all else equal. White and Hispanic students tend to 
score higher than African American students in ELA; and FRL eligible students tend to perform 
worse than their counterparts in math. While the majority of these estimates are not statistically 
significant, it is important to see that they are largely in the expected direction. 
  
                                                 
24 In particular, LSP scholarship receipt is associated with a 70 percent increase in the likelihood 
of using a scholarship to enroll in a private school across all models. In addition, the associated 
joint F-statistics are substantially greater than Staiger and Stock’s (1997) recommended 
threshold for instrumental variable relevance. 
25 The results presented in Table 3 do not appear to be driven by a dramatic achievement gains in 






Estimated Effects of LSP Enrollment Exposure on Student Achievement 
  ELA   Math 















(0.07) (0.07) (0.08)  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Baseline Achievement 
0.66*** 0.65*** 0.65***  0.63*** 0.62*** 0.62*** 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Female 
 0.15*** 0.15***   0.10** 0.10** 
 (0.04) (0.04)   (0.04) (0.05) 
FRL  -0.18** 
-
0.18***   0.03 0.03 
 (0.08) (0.07)   (0.07) (0.07) 
Race/Ethnicity†        
   Hispanic 
 0.13 0.13   0.25** 0.25* 
 (0.18) (0.17)   (0.11) (0.14) 
   White 
 0.11 0.11   0.24*** 0.24*** 
 (0.09) (0.09)   (0.07) (0.06) 
   Other 
 -0.04 -0.04   0.04 0.04 
 (0.15) (0.11)   (0.21) (0.17) 
In New Orleans School 
  0.16*    0.04 
  (0.09)    (0.10) 
N 1,766 1,766 1,766  1,766 1,766 1,766 
Risk Sets 194 194 194  194 194 194 
Within R-squared 0.42 0.43 0.43  0.39 0.39 0.39 
Between R-Squared 0.44 0.42 0.41  0.30 0.30 0.31 
Overall R-Squared 0.42 0.42 0.42   0.38 0.38 0.38 
*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10 
† Excluded comparison group is African American students 
Notes. Performance measures standardized within grade based on control group score distributions. All models 
include risk set fixed effects. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering within risk sets. 
Source. Authors’ calculations. 
At the same time, it is important to note that these results are based on a subset of 
students (approximately twenty percent of all eligible LSP applicants). Furthermore, given that 
the observed grades are not typical entry grades for schools, these effects may not be 





caveats aside, the results presented in Table 3 indicate sizeable negative one-year achievement 
impacts, especially in math, associated with winning an LSP scholarship.26 
Subgroup Analysis 
In addition to estimating the general impacts of participation in the LSP on student 
achievement, we are interested in how various student subgroups respond to the treatment. Table 
4 presents LATE estimates for three subgroup comparisons: females versus males, African 
Americans compared to other students, and LSP scholarship users enrolling in New Orleans 
schools compared to students enrolling in private schools in other locations.27 Joint F statistics 
from first stage regressions predicting LSP usage and an interaction of LSP usage and a 
subgroup identifier are presented along with the overall results. Each of the reported F-statistics 
suggests that the LSP scholarship receipt is a relevant predictor of usage. 
In general, the results presented in Table 4 do not reflect substantial heterogeneous effects 
among the examined subgroups of students. In general, while the point estimates are slightly 
different for each subgroup, the results suggest that LSP scholarship users performed 
significantly worse than their counterparts in both ELA and math, irrespective of their 
backgrounds.28 A single exception is observed in the New Orleans subgroup analysis, which 
suggests that students using the scholarship in New Orleans experienced significantly more 
negative math impacts than other students. Nevertheless, it is important to note that these results 
                                                 
26 While our analysis focuses on differences in ELA and math achievement, we have confirmed 
that these large negative effects are equally present in both science and social studies 
achievement. In particular, the results presented in Appendix Table A2 indicate that eligible 
applicants offered an LSP scholarship were about a third of a standard deviation behind their 
control group counterparts in science and over forty percent of a standard deviation behind in 
social studies. 
27 The results are based on the models that include terms interacting predicted LSP exposure with 
the particular subgroup of interest. 
28 It is interesting to note that our results suggest that African American LSP users experience 
worse performance impacts than other LSP users when one considers prior RCT evaluations of 





are likely reflective of a collinearity issue because risk set fixed effects include one’s application 
school. By including risk set fixed effects, we are effectively limiting our comparisons to 
students in the same priority category applying to the same school and grade. Our regression 
results are therefore based on within-risk set variation, or cases in which there is sufficient 
variation within the risk set group in the given characteristics. The New Orleans subgroup 
analysis, for example, is based solely on those risk sets that include both students living in New 
Orleans and those not living in New Orleans in 2011-12. Given that individuals are highly likely 
to choose a private school in their parish, it is unlikely that many risk sets are contributing to the 
subgroup estimates for New Orleans. We therefore strongly recommend against generalizing 
them to New Orleans as a whole. 
Finally, we examine the extent to which the estimated effects vary across the LSP 
applicant baseline achievement distribution. It would be particularly concerning, for example, to 
find that the negative effects are largely captured by students who were already among the worst 
performers at entry. The results presented in Table 5 provide a descriptive examination of the 
different ways students in the bottom, middle, and top third of the baseline achievement 
distribution experienced the LSP after one year. Specifically, Table 5 presents results of 
regressions run separately on these three performance subgroups. Column 1 presents the 
subgroup sample size; column 2 provides descriptive information for the control group’s year 1 
performance distribution for the selected sample; column 3 presents results for regressions that 
only control for baseline achievement and student risk set; and column 4 presents results for fully 







Estimated Effects of LSP Usage by Subgroup 
 ELA  Math 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Gender Subgroup Analysis       
Female -0.22*** -0.22** -0.23***  
-
0.65*** -0.65*** -0.65*** 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.08)  (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) 
Male -0.20** -0.21* -0.21**  
-
0.65*** -0.66*** -0.66*** 
 (0.08) (0.11) (0.08)  (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) 
Difference -0.01 -0.02 -0.02  0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.10) (0.12) (0.09)  (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) 
First stage F        
   Exposure 507.3 255.6 227.9  505.8 254.7 227.0 
   Interaction 881.1 443.9 395.5  881.7 444.1 395.6 
Race/Ethnicity Subgroup Analysis      
African American -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.23***  
-
0.68*** -0.68*** -0.68*** 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)  (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) 
Not African American -0.15 -0.14 -0.15  
-
0.44*** -0.44*** -0.44*** 
 (0.19) (0.16) (0.17)  (0.12) (0.16) (0.16) 
Difference -0.07 -0.08 -0.08  -0.23 -0.24 -0.24 
 (0.19) (0.15) (0.16)  (0.14) (0.15) (0.16) 
First stage F        
   Exposure 507.0 340.8 292.9  505.5 339.5 291.7 
   Interaction 541.2 362.0 310.3  539.8 360.9 309.3 
New Orleans Subgroup Analysis       
New Orleans Student -0.28 -0.29   
-
1.00*** -1.00***  
 (0.23) (0.22)   (0.32) (0.22)  
Other Student -0.21*** -0.21**   
-
0.61*** -0.61***  
 (0.07) (0.09)   (0.09) (0.11)  
Difference -0.08 -0.08   -0.40* -0.39*  
 (0.21) (0.25)   (0.23) (0.24)  
First stage F        
   Exposure 522.6 234.1   521.1 233.2  
   Interaction 364.9 161.8   360.9 159.9  
Model Summary        
    Demographic 





    New Orleans 
Control   X   X X 
    N 1766 1766 1766  1766 1766 1766 
    Risk Sets 194 194 194  194 194 194 
*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10 
Notes. Performance measures standardized within grade based on control group score distributions. All models 
include risk set fixed effects. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering within risk sets. 






The results presented in Table 5 suggest that students in the bottom third of the ELA 
achievement distribution at baseline performed no differently than control group students after 
one year. On the other hand, the LATE estimates for the middle and top performers largely 
mirror the overall significant negative finding presented in Table 3. 
Table 5 
 










(1) (2) (3) (4) 
ELA achievement 
Bottom third 591 -0.788 0.11 0.09 
  (0.97) (0.13) (0.15) 
Middle third 596 0.021 -0.27** -0.30** 
  (0.66) (0.13) (0.14) 
Top third 579 0.721 -0.28*** -0.26** 
    (0.73) (0.10) (0.12) 
Math achievement 
Bottom third 608 -0.651 -0.71*** -0.73*** 
  (0.68) (0.21) (0.19) 
Middle third 582 -0.062 -0.60*** -0.61*** 
  (0.23) (0.15) (0.15) 
Top third 576 -0.765 -0.68*** -0.67*** 
    (0.73) (0.14) (0.13) 
*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10 
Notes. Performance measures standardized within grade based on control group score distributions. All models 
include risk set fixed effects. Results presented in column 3 are based on models that only control for student 
baseline achievement. Results presented in column 4 are based on models additionally including controls for 
demographics and being a New Orleans resident. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering within risk 
sets. 
Source. Authors’ calculations. 
 
In contrast, the findings for math suggest that all groups experienced significant declines 
in achievement when using an LSP scholarship. While the coefficient estimates indicate that 
students in the bottom and top thirds of the math achievement distribution at baseline performed 





particularly noisy—which is to be expected given the smaller sample sizes—and the 95 percent 
confidence intervals for each of the regressions largely overlap. 
Thus, in general, the results presented in Table 5 suggest that students performing poorly 
in ELA at baseline did not experience large achievement declines after using an LSP scholarship 
and the negative effects of the program were largely experienced uniformly among remaining 
students. 
Robustness Checks 
In general, our analyses indicate that participation in the first year of the statewide 
expansion of the LSP negatively impacted student achievement on Louisiana’s state assessments. 
These negative findings are unique among random assignment evaluations of school voucher 
programs, all of which have found insignificant or positive outcomes. Given the uniqueness and 
magnitude of these estimated effects, especially in math, it is important to test if the results are 
sensitive to our chosen analytic strategy. This section presents the results from sensitivity 
analyses designed to test the robustness of our findings. 
Sensitivity of results to differential attrition. Our first robustness check examines the 
extent to which our estimated effects are sensitive to the different rates of attrition observed 
between treatment and control group members in our sample. Specifically, we find that 108—or 
9.1 percent—of students who did not win an LSP to their first choice school do not appear in the 
state’s assessment data in 2012-13; whereas only 4.4 percent of LSP winners are missing. While 
this difference is not cause for great concern (What Works Clearinghouse, 2014), it is important 
to consider if differential attrition is driving our primary findings. 
If we can assume the observed differences in attrition are due to random factors, our 





Green, 2012). On the other hand, if the observed differences are due to systemic, yet 
unobservable, sample selection effects, our primary estimates of the effect of using an LSP 
scholarship on student achievement are biased (Gerber & Green, 2012; Lee, 2009). If, for 
example, those in the control group with higher expected outcomes both in public and private 
school leave the sample with higher probability, our LATE estimates will be positively biased. 
In this section, we examine the extent to which differential attrition may be biasing our 
results by using two bounding strategies. The first, developed by Lee (2009) and hereafter 
referred to as “Lee Bounds”, involves removing a subset of applicants from the treatment group 
in an attempt to parse out marginal individuals who have selected into the sample only because 
they received an LSP scholarship.29 In particular, Lee shows that if you can assume that 
problematic attrition is only present in either the treatment or control group, then you can 
effectively bound the average treatment effect for individuals whose treatment status does not 
influence their sample selection likelihood by trimming away from that group a percentage of 
applicants equal to the attrition difference from the bottom and top performers. These trimming 
procedures produce upper and lower bounds of the effect, respectively. 
One of the primary benefits of Lee’s bounding method is that it does not require strong 
assumptions on the selection mechanism producing the attrition problems beyond the assumption 
that the effect is only present in either the treatment or control groups. For example, one need not 
assume that control group attritors are either more- or less-academically able than students who 
                                                 
29 Lee’s (2009) bounding method is built on two assumptions: that the assignment mechanism is 
random and that sample selection is a monotonic function of treatment status. The first 
assumption is easily satisfied by the LSP lottery process. The second assumption essentially 
requires that there are no LSP applicants who were assigned an LSP scholarship but decided to 
forgo their scholarship and instead enroll in a private school at their own expense. While we 
cannot validate this assumption empirically, it seems highly unlikely that such “defiers” exist in 





actively choose to remain in the sample. Nevertheless, the simplicity of Lee’s method comes at a 
cost: Lee bounds can be quite large—especially in the presence of large differences in 
nonresponse rates. In contrast, Angrist, Bettinger, and Kremer (2006)—hereafter “ABK”—note 
that one can estimate tighter bounds of a program’s effect on individuals who would always 
select into the sample by assuming that attrition is more likely to come from one of the tails of 
the outcome variable. For example, if we assume that the differential attrition rate we observe in 
our control group is largely explained by more advantaged families opting to enroll in private 
schools at their own expense, we can use the ABK method by focusing on estimating effects at 
the lower end of the observed outcome distribution.30 Effectively, the ABK method assumes that 
individuals whose sample selection decision is conditional on their treatment status are likely to 
be present around a particular margin in the outcome distribution; and we should therefore focus 
on the other side of the outcome distribution to bound the estimated effect for the subgroup of 
students who would always select into the sample. 
Table 6 presents both the original LATE estimates produced in Table 3–included as a 
reference—as well as results from the two bounding exercises described. Columns 2 through 4 
present models controlling only for baseline achievement and risk set while columns 5 through 7 
present models that additionally include controls for demographics and residence. 
As expected, the Lee bounds presented in Table 6 are quite large, with gaps of over 30 
percent of a standard deviation in achievement. Despite the magnitude of these gaps, the results 
for math are consistent with LSP scholarship usage having a negative effect on achievement. In 
                                                 
30 Simple comparisons of baseline characteristics indicate that control-group attriters performed 
slightly worse in both math and ELA on average relative to the control group average. While this 
suggests that we should instead focus on the top end of the performance distribution, we cannot 






contrast, the results for ELA suggest that—in a best case scenario—LSP scholarship usage may 
have had an insignificant effect on student achievement after one year. Given the magnitude of 
the estimated effect, along with the knowledge that these estimates are based on removing the 
lowest performers from the treatment group, we are hesitant to conclude that the overall effect of 
the LSP on ELA achievement was null in the first year of the statewide expansion. Nevertheless, 
if this assumption is met, the results presented in Table 6 suggest the possibility that the two 
groups did not differ in ELA achievement after one year. 
The ABK bounding procedure yields similar results for math: for the most part all lower 
and upper ABK bounds indicate a large negative effect of LSP scholarship usage on math 
achievement after one year. In contrast, the ABK results for ELA are insignificant in all cases. 
While this is likely due to the substantially smaller sample sizes used to construct ABK bounds, 
this finding does correspond with the earlier subgroup analysis indicating that students with 
lower ELA achievement at baseline did not tend to experience large declines in performance 
associated with LSP scholarship usage. 
In general, the results presented in this section do not suggest that differential attrition has 
strongly biased the primary results presented in Table 3. Specifically, unless we make fairly 
restrictive assumptions, LSP scholarship usage continues to be associated with negative impacts 
in both math and ELA achievement. Furthermore, given that we do not know the reason for the 
higher attrition rates observed among the control group, we generally prefer the Lee bounds over 
the ABK bounds. While our upper bound estimate of the LSP effect on ELA achievement using 
Lee’s bounds is indeed statistically insignificant, we caution the reader against using this extreme 








Accounting for Differential Attrition  
  
N 
(Lower bound / Upper bound) 














 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
ELA achievement 
Primary LATE 1,766 
-0.21***    -0.22***   
(0.06)    (0.06)   
Lee bounds 1,733 / 1,731 
 -0.28*** -0.05   -0.29*** -0.06 
 (0.06) (0.05)   (0.09) (0.06) 
ABK bounds         
    30th percentile 528 / 610 
 -0.11 0.15   -0.16 0.12 
 (0.15) (0.12)   (0.15) (0.14) 
    25th percentile 
431 / 506 
 -0.10 0.20   -0.13 0.17 
 (0.16) (0.12)   (0.15) (0.13) 
  (1544.82) (0.89)   (7.12) (0.83) 
Math achievement 
Primary LATE 1,766 
-0.65***    -0.65***   
(0.10)    (0.09)   
Lee bounds 1,733 / 1,727 
 -0.72*** -0.43***   -0.72*** -0.44*** 
 (0.08) (0.07)   (0.08) (0.07) 
ABK bounds         
    30th percentile 522 / 641 
 -0.94*** -0.30**   -0.97*** -0.33** 
 (0.18) (0.13)   (0.18) (0.16) 
    25th percentile 433 / 554 
 -0.96*** -0.26*   -0.98*** -0.27 
  (0.24) (0.13)     (0.27) (0.18) 
*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10 
Notes. Performance measures standardized within grade based on control group score distributions. All models include risk set fixed effects. Lee bounds lower 
bounds are based on removing the top 4.8 percent of performers from the treatment group and Lee upper bounds are based on removing the bottom 4.8 percent. 
Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering within risk sets. 




Sensitivity of results to definitions of enrollment and lotteries. Our second check 
examines the sensitivity of results to our chosen definitions of LSP scholarship usage and what 
constitutes a lottery. Regarding scholarship usage, we have up to this point largely focused on 
enrollment exposure—or the percentage of quarters an individual used an LSP scholarship to 
enroll in a private school—to capture the effects of the LSP in the first year of statewide 
expansion. Alternatively, we could identify the effects of LSP scholarship usage using a 
dichotomous variable simply indicating if a student ever attended a private school (Wolf et al., 
2010). In addition, we have chosen to define lotteries as cases in which a group of individuals 
that had the same priority category and who applied to the same grade in the same school had an 
observed chance of winning a lottery greater than 0 but less than 100. Thus, as another 
robustness check, we examine the extent to which our estimated effects differ in a subsample 
based on a restricted definition of what constitutes a lottery. Given the unexpected direction and 
magnitude of our findings, we would hope that our results are not sensitive to such definitions. 
Table 7 presents the results from models using alternative definitions of enrollment and 
lotteries. For the sake of comparison, Columns (1) and (4) duplicate the results for the most 
specified versions of our primary models presented in Table 3. In columns (2) and (5), we 
present the results of models substituting a variable indicating if a student ever used their LSP to 
enroll in a private school for our variable indicating the percentage of private school enrollment. 
Columns (3) and (6), on the other hand, present the results of analyses that mirror our primary  
models, but in which we have restricted the analytical sample to individuals who have 






Estimated LSP Usage Effects Using Alternative Definitions of Enrollment and Lotteries 
 ELA  Math 











 (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.10) 
LSP Ever Enrolled  
-
0.21***    
-
0.63***  
  (0.07)    (0.09)  
Baseline Achievement 0.65*** 0.65*** 0.65***  0.62*** 0.62*** 0.62*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)  (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Female 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15***  0.10** 0.11** 0.10** 





0.18***  0.03 0.03 0.03 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
Race/Ethnicity        
   Hispanic 0.13 0.12 0.13  0.25* 0.24** 0.26** 
 (0.17) (0.15) (0.16)  (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) 
   White 0.11 0.11 0.12  0.24*** 0.23*** 0.25*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
   Other -0.04 -0.04 -0.04  0.04 0.04 0.04 
 (0.11) (0.14) (0.12)  (0.17) (0.21) (0.17) 
In New Orleans School 0.16* 0.16 0.16  0.04 0.03 0.04 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.12)  (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) 
N 1766 1766 1748  1766 1766 1748 
Risk Sets 194 194 193  194 194 193 
Within R-squared 0.43 0.43 0.43  0.39 0.39 0.39 
Between R-Squared 0.41 0.40 0.41  0.31 0.31 0.31 
Overall R-Squared 0.42 0.42 0.42  0.38 0.38 0.38 
*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10 
Notes. Performance measures standardized within grade based on control group score distributions. All models 
include risk set fixed effects. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering within risk sets. 
Source. Authors’ calculations. 
The results presented in Table 7 clearly indicate that our results are sensitive neither to 
our definition of enrollment or lottery. While we can continue to explore the sensitivity of these 
results to alternative definitions of enrollment or even more restrictive definitions of lotteries, the 




Accounting for differences in the number of school preferences offered. The baseline 
equivalency results presented in Table 2 indicate that eligible LSP applicants who won an LSP to 
their first choice school offered slightly fewer school choices on average relative to applicants 
who did not receive a scholarship to their first choice school. The analyses presented thus far 
have not directly accounted for this difference. Instead, we have effectively assumed that the 
statistical significance of this finding is essentially due to random chance. 
In Table 8, we examine the extent to which our primary estimates are affected by this 
assumption by including fixed effects capturing the number of school preferences offered by a 
student. Columns 1 through 3 present findings for ELA achievement and columns 4 through 6 
present our findings for math. The models employ more control variables as one moves from left 
to right within each performance grouping. The excluded comparison group for school choices is 
one. By using fixed effects, as opposed to a continuous variable identifying the number of school 
preferences offered, we are allowing for maximum flexibility in capturing differences in LSP 
applicants offering different numbers of school options. 
In general, the results presented in Table 8 strongly mirror those presented in Table 3: 
LSP scholarship users are found to be 22 percent of a standard deviation behind the control 
group in ELA achievement after one year and 66 percent of a standard deviation behind in math. 
Furthermore, the coefficient estimates for the included school preference grouping fixed effects 
are insignificant in nearly every case, indicating that students offering more than one school 
preference generally do not differ in final achievement relative to applicants offering only one 
option. Thus, the results presented in Table 8 generally suggest that the significant difference 




unlikely to have strongly biased our estimates of the effect of using an LSP scholarship on 
student achievement after one year. 
Table 8 
Estimated Effects of LSP Usage Comparing Individuals Offering the Same Number of School 
Preferences 
  ELA achievement   Math achievement 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
LSP Enrollment Exposure 
-0.22** -0.22*** -0.22***  -0.65*** -0.65*** -0.66*** 
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) 
School preferences offered†       
    Two 
-0.07 -0.06 -0.07  -0.12* -0.10 -0.10 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
    Three 
-0.04 -0.04 -0.04  -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
    Four 
-0.03 -0.03 -0.03  -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
    Five 
-0.11 -0.10 -0.10  -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 
(0.09) (0.08) (0.10)  (0.11) (0.08) (0.10) 
Model Summary        
    Demographic controls X X   X X 
    New Orleans control   X    X 
N 1,766 1,766 1,766  1,766 1,766 1,766 
Risk sets 194 194 194   194 194 194 
*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10 
† - Excluded comparison group is students who only offered one school preference. 
Notes. Performance measures standardized within grade based on control group score distributions. All models 
include risk set fixed effects. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering within risk sets. 
Source. Authors’ calculations. 
Curricular advantage? Prior experimental analyses examining the achievement impacts 
of public and private voucher programs have not found any statistically significant negative 
program impacts. Thus, our findings of substantial negative first year impacts of statewide 
expansion of the LSP are surprising. At the same time, it is important to recognize that our 
analyses are based on achievement on the Louisiana state assessments, rather than nationally 




with curricula that are already aligned with the state assessments, while private schools have yet 
to align their curricula. 
While we cannot provide an exhaustive examination of the teaching methods of the 
private schools in our sample, our testing data allow us to partially examine this question. We 
test for a curricular advantage by making use of the fact that some of the Louisiana state 
assessments include both criterion-referenced and norm-referenced exam questions. In particular, 
while the Louisiana assessments in grades four and eight only include criterion-referenced items, 
the iLEAP assessments offered in grades three, five, six, and seven include both criterion- and 
norm-referenced exam questions. If public school students experience a disproportionate 
curricular advantage, one would expect smaller negative LATE impact estimates on the iLEAP 
exams than on the LEAP exams. 
Table 9 presents results from models examining the extent to which LSP usage effects 
differ across test type. For both ELA and math, we find that students taking the LEAP exam do 
appear to perform worse than iLEAP takers; however the estimated differences are statistically 
insignificant in all but one case. While not definitive, this pattern of results suggests that the 
substantial negative LATE impact estimates could be partially driven by the stronger alignment 
of the public school curricula to the state assessments. At the same time, it is important to note 
that LSP scholarship users still performed quite poorly on the hybrid iLEAP exams. Thus, while 
these findings may provide some insight into the substantial magnitude of our estimated impacts, 







Estimated LSP Scholarship Usage Effects by Test Type 
  ELA   Math 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
LSP User taking iLEAP -0.18*** 
-
0.18*** -0.19***  -0.57*** -0.56*** -0.56*** 
(CRT-NRT Hybrid) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06)  (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
LSP User taking LEAP -0.31* -0.33* -0.34**  -0.90*** -0.92*** -0.92*** 
(CRT only) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18)  (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Difference 
-0.11 -0.14 -0.14  -0.33* -0.35 -0.35 
(0.17) (0.20) (0.22)  (0.20) (0.23) (0.26) 
Model Summary        
Demographic Controls  X X   X X 
New Orleans Control   X   X X 
N 1,766 1,766 1,766  1,766 1,766 1,766 
Risk Sets 194 194 194  194 194 194 
First stage F        
   Exposure 686.1 259.5 231.3  684.1 258.4 230.3 
   Interaction 409.7 155.3 137.9  409.5 155.2 137.9 
*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10 
Notes. Performance measures standardized within grade based on control group score distributions. All models 
include risk set fixed effects. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering within risk sets. 
Source. Authors’ calculations. 
Conclusion 
This paper presents the preliminary analyses of the first year participant effects of the 
statewide expansion of the Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP), one of the newest and largest 
school voucher programs in the U.S. This study contributes to the existing literature on the 
participant effects of publicly funded voucher programs for two reasons. First, it uses a highly 
rigorous experimental design to estimate treatment effects while avoiding self-selection bias 
concerns. Second, it is the first evaluation of a statewide school voucher program. These 
contributions will add to the existing knowledge on the effects of private school choice 
programs. 
The results presented in this paper indicate significant and substantial negative 




scholarship usage is associated with a quarter of a standard deviation decline in ELA 
achievement and nearly two-thirds of a standard deviation decline in math. These findings are 
the first of their kind among random assignment evaluations of school voucher programs and are 
robust to several alternative specifications. 
At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that our analyses are based on a small 
subsample of participants in the first year of the program with performance data on the Louisiana 
state assessments. Specifically, our analysis sample represents approximately twenty percent of 
the 2012 cohort of eligible applicants. Thus, in a real sense, this paper is not an evaluation of the 
entire program, but an evaluation of the experiences of students in grades three through seven at 
baseline, who participated in actual lotteries, with testing outcomes in year 1. The educational 
impact of the LSP on the many thousands of program participants who do not satisfy those 
criteria remains, at this point, unknown. Readers are encouraged not to draw firm conclusions 
from this initial analysis due to the severe threats to external validity posed by those limitations 
of the sample. 
At this point we can only speculate as to why our results differ so dramatically from the 
voucher experiments conducted previously. Our working hypothesis at this point is that a higher-
quality set of private schools participated in earlier voucher and scholarship programs in 
Washington, DC; New York City; Dayton, Ohio; and Charlotte, North Carolina; in which more 
positive voucher experimental impacts were reported. Less than one-third of the private schools 
in Louisiana chose to participate in the LSP in its first year, possibly because of the extensive 
regulations placed on the program by government authorities (Kisida, Wolf, & Rhinesmith, 




regulatory requirements may have played a role in preventing the private school choice program 
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First Stage Regression Results Using LSP Receipt to Predict Usage 
  ELA   Math 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
LSP Awarded 
0.70*** 0.70*** 0.70***  0.70*** 0.70*** 0.70*** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Demographic controls  X X   X X 
New Orleans School Control   X    X 
        
N 1766 1766 1766  1766 1766 1766 
Risk Sets 194 194 194  194 194 194 
Joint F-statistic 1014.39 292.25 256.43  1011.56 291.17 306.75 
Adj. R-Squared 0.66 0.66 0.66   0.66 0.66 0.65 
*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10 
Notes. Performance measures standardized within grade based on control group score distributions. All models 
include risk set fixed effects. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering within risk sets. 







Estimated effects of LSP Usage on Science and Social Studies Achievement 
  Science   Social Studies 















(0.07) (0.07) (0.08)  (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) 
Baseline Achievement 
0.53*** 0.52*** 0.52***  0.46*** 0.45*** 0.45*** 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Female 
 0.01 0.01   0.02 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.03)   (0.04) (0.05) 
FRL 
 -0.20** -0.20**   -0.18 -0.18** 
 (0.10) (0.09)   (0.12) (0.09) 
Race/Ethnicity       
   Hispanic 
 0.30** 0.30***   0.07 0.07 
 (0.12) (0.12)   (0.15) (0.14) 
   White 
 0.33*** 0.33***   0.28*** 0.28*** 
 (0.08) (0.09)   (0.08) (0.08) 
   Other 
 0.23 0.22   -0.09 -0.09 
 (0.19) (0.17)   (0.16) (0.16) 
In New Orleans School 
  -0.07    0.08 
  (0.11)    (0.13) 
N 1,744 1,744 1,744  1,743 1,743 1,743 
Risk Sets 194 194 194  194 194 194 
Within R-squared 0.31 0.32 0.32  0.24 0.24 0.24 
Between R-Squared 0.31 0.32 0.32  0.17 0.17 0.17 
Overall R-Squared 0.31 0.33 0.32   0.24 0.24 0.24 
*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10 
Notes. Performance measures standardized within grade based on control group score distributions. All models 
include risk set fixed effects. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering within risk sets. 






Figure A1. Comparison of treatment and control group average ELA performance over time. 
Achievement has been standardized by grade and year to the Louisiana state test taking 
distribution. Dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals for the performance averages. 
These results indicate that control group students did experience a mild improvement relative to 
the state over time; however treatment group students experienced a large decline in performance 
between 2011-12 and 2012-13. 
 
 
Figure A2. Comparison of treatment and control group average math performance over time. 
Achievement has been standardized by grade and year to the Louisiana state test taking 
distribution. Dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals for the performance averages. 
These results indicate that control group students did experience a mild improvement relative to 
the state over time; however treatment group students experienced a large decline in performance 






























































































While the majority of quantitative studies examining the effects of school choice 
programs on participating students have tended to focus on academic and attainment outcomes, a 
growing body of research suggests that other skills should also play an important role in such 
evaluations (Mills, 2013). Specifically, studies have found that character skills such as 
conscientiousness and self-control are predictive of individual academic and workforce success 
(Almlund et al. 2011; Heckman & Kautz, 2012; Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). More 
importantly, evidence from some studies suggests that different education environments can 
influence these skills (Cunha & Heckman, 2008; Dee & West, 2011; Jackson, 2012; West et al., 
2014). While two recent studies have examined the relationship between enrollment in charter 
schools and non-cognitive skills (Dobbie & Fryer, 2014; West et al., 2014); no such research 
exists for private school voucher programs. This paper aims to address this gap by providing the 
first descriptive analysis of differences in non-cognitive skills and measures of political tolerance 
associated with the Louisiana Scholarship Program. 
Specifically, we examine differences in student responses to several measures of non-
cognitive skills and political tolerance collected through a phone survey conducted between 
November, 2014 and February, 2015. The specific non-cognitive skills measures included in our 
analysis are the Grit scale (Duckworth & Quinn, 2012), the Locus of Control scale (Rotter, 
1966), and the Rosenberg’s (1965) Self-esteem scale. In general, the findings presented in this 
                                                 




paper suggest no strong differences between students who received an LSP scholarship and those 
who did not across all measures. These findings hold across several specifications and robustness 
checks. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we describe the 
existing literature examining the development of non-cognitive skills and civic attitudes in 
private school choice systems. We then outline the methodology used to estimate differences in 
these skills in the first group of students to experience the expansion of the Louisiana 
Scholarship Program statewide. Next, we present our primary results and a series of checks 
designed to estimate the robustness of our findings. Finally, we conclude with a summary of our 
findings and implications for future research. 
Alternative outcomes and school choice 
Evaluations of school voucher programs have generally focused on estimating voucher 
impacts on student achievement and attainment (Mills, 2013). The focus on academic outcomes 
is intuitive, as student achievement is strongly linked to the economic success of individuals 
(Heckman, 2008) and countries (Hanushek & Woessman, 2009). Moreover, recent moves to test-
based accountability systems in the United States have made measures of student achievement 
increasingly available to researchers (West et al., 2014). 
At the same time, there is a growing body of research demonstrating that measures of 
student non-cognitive skills—such as self-control and conscientiousness—are also predictive of 
short- and long-run life outcomes (Almlund et al. 2011; Heckman & Kautz, 2012; Tangney, 
Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). Furthermore, there has been a long-standing view in the United 
States of the role of education in developing future citizens, in addition to positive economic 




voucher evaluations to expand beyond measures of student achievement and attainment in 
assessing program effectiveness. In the following sections, we review literature supporting the 
importance of non-cognitive skills and civic engagement, as well as existing evidence of the 
effectiveness of school choice programs in promoting these outcomes. In general, the literature 
on the effects of voucher programs in developing these skills is quite limited; a finding which we 
argue supports the importance of our work. 
The importance of non-cognitive skills and the role of school choice in their development 
While evidence indicates positive relationships between student academics and later life 
outcomes (Heckman, 2008), recent empirical research has also demonstrated the important roles 
other characteristics play in life outcomes. These skills fall under the broad classification of 
“non-cognitive skills” in the economics literature, which West et al. (2014) note “has become a 
catchall tem for traits of skills not captured by assessments of cognitive ability and knowledge.” 
(p. 1) Many of these skills have been found to be linked to positive short- and long-run life 
outcomes. For example, Tangney, Baumesiter, and Boone (2004) find in an analysis of college 
students that measures of self-control are strongly related to college GPA, adjustment to college, 
and better emotional responses to stressful situations. Conscientiousness, defined as strong 
attention to detail and vigilance—has been found to be a strong predictor of school success and 
attainment (Farkas, 2003; Lleras, 2008; Almlund et al. 2011), as well as future employment and 
earnings (Farkas, 2003). In addition, Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006) have found evidence 
of negative relationships between non-cognitive skills and the likelihood of incarceration and 
teenage pregnancy using data collected by the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) 




and non-cognitive skills are somewhat to be expected, given that traits like conscientiousness and 
self-control tend to be particularly valuable in the workplace. 
This evidence of the potential for positive economic returns to non-cognitive skills 
development has recently captured the attention of policymakers, the media, and the general 
public (Tough, 2012; Whitman, 2008). As West and colleagues (2014) note, policymakers and 
practitioners are becoming increasingly interested in the development and use of measures of 
student non-cognitive skills. Furthermore, while the malleability of non-cognitive skills is the 
focus of contentious debate in the psychological literature (Almlund et al. 2011, Baumesiter, 
Vohs, & Trice, 2007; Duckworth, Peterson, Matthews, & Kelly, 2007), studies have found that 
different education environments may influence these character skills (Cunha & Heckman, 2008; 
Dee & West, 2011; Jackson, 2012; West et al., 2014).  
Unfortunately, the literature estimating the effects of school voucher programs on the 
development of non-cognitive skills is very limited. Specifically, none of the existing 
experimental evaluations of school vouchers have included a non-cognitive component in their 
analysis beyond the proxies of high school attainment and college enrollment (Wolf et. al. 2013; 
Cowen et al. 2013; Chingos & Peterson 2015; and Warren 2011). This lack of research is 
somewhat surprising, given the specific emphasis placed by many private schools on discipline 
(Figlio & Ludwig, 2012), explicit attempts at character building (Bryk, Lee, & Holland, 1993), 
as well as existing evidence from longitudinal studies finding that private school attendance is 
associated with significantly fewer risky behaviors on average (Figlio & Ludwig, 2012; Mocan 
& Tekin, 2007).  
While the literature on the effects of voucher programs on the development of non-




schools have included non-cognitive skills measures in their broader evaluation of program 
effectiveness. In general, however, the findings from these studies suggest that charter schools 
may harm the development of non-cognitive skills. For example, Dobbie and Fryer (2014), find 
that students winning admission via lottery to the Promise Academy middle school in Harlem, 
NY exhibited lower rates of self-esteem and “grit” relative to lottery losers—albeit only the latter 
results were statistically significant. Furthermore, West and colleagues note a paradoxical 
finding in their 2014 evaluation of Boston public and charter schools: student self-assessments of 
non-cognitive skills are strongly and positively related to attendance, behaviors, and achievement 
gains; however relationships at the school level are insignificant or negatively related to school 
level measures. Furthermore, students attending high performing charter schools report 
particularly low scores on non-cognitive skills measures. After providing a series of specification 
checks, the authors argue that their results are likely driven by a reference group bias, whereby 
students in more disciplined schooling environments may be holding themselves to higher 
standards than students in other schools.32 
In summary, the existing literature on non-cognitive skills development in schools of 
choice is very limited. Among the 11 existing random assignment evaluations of school voucher 
programs in the United States, none have examined how vouchers impact student non-cognitive 
skills development. Furthermore, while existing evidence from charter school evaluations 
suggest the potential for negative impacts, there is strong reason to believe that these results are 
driven by school environment (West et al., 2014).33 Nevertheless, given increasing evidence of a 
                                                 
32 Dobbie and Fryer (2014) similarly hypothesized that such reference group bias could be 
driving their negative results; however they do not investigate further. 
33 This sentiment is shared by Tuttle and colleagues in their 2013 experimental evaluation of 
KIPP middle schools. In particular, they find that students randomly admitted to KIPP via 




link between non-cognitive skills and positive life outcomes, as well as the explicit focus of 
many private schools on such alternative educational outcomes, it is important to document the 
development of non-cognitive skills in school choice evaluations. The present study, which 
includes survey measures of non-cognitive skills, represents a first step in addressing this gap in 
the school voucher literature. 
Civic skills and school choice 
Supporters of traditional public schools often argue that one of the primary benefits of 
democratically governed education is that it can educate children to successfully promote our 
democratic values (Dewey, 1916; Gutmann, 2003; Henig, 1999). For example, Amy Gutmann 
(2003) claims “[a] central part of the historic mission of a democratically accredited school 
system is to educate citizens who are capable of sitting on juries, assessing public proposals 
(about schools, for example), exercising their rights, fulfilling their responsibilities, and seizing 
their opportunities to live a good life as they see fit.” (p. 126) School choice, opponents argue, 
will lead to a fractured system of education and will therefore fail to pass on our collective 
values (Berliner & Biddle, 1996). 
Wolf (2005) examines the evidence on the effects of school choice and civic values in a 
systematic review, focusing on findings from experimental studies as well as rigorous quasi-
experimental methods that approximate random assignment. In general, he notes that 20 studies 
with 48 separate estimates of civic effects of private school choice meet his selection criteria. Of 
the 48 total estimates, he finds only three indicating that private school choice negatively affects 
                                                 
in school while also being significantly more likely to complete their homework on time. The 
authors note that these seemingly contradictory findings may be reflective of KIPP’s “no 





civic values. In contrast, 29 findings (60 percent) are either positive or contingently positive.34 In 
the present study, we focus exclusively on estimating differences in measures of political 
tolerance between students awarded an LSP scholarship and those not receiving a scholarship. 
As such, it is worth highlighting Wolf’s (2005) findings regarding private schooling and political 
tolerance. Wolf includes seven studies estimating the effects of private school attendance on 
political tolerance in his 2005 review. These studies were included because they either used 
random assignment (Campbell, 2002; Howell & Peterson, 2002; Wolf, Peterson, & West, 2001) 
or were published in peer-reviewed journals. In general, Wolf finds private school attendance 
associated with higher levels of tolerance, although some studies found no difference between 
public and private school students.35 
In general, the evidence presented in this section indicates a large gap in the school 
voucher literature, whereby none of the existing voucher evaluations have examined either non-
cognitive skills development or measures of civic engagement. This paper therefore aims to 
provide a first attempt at addressing this gap in the literature by describing differences in 
measures of non-cognitive skills and political tolerance among students who received and did not 
receive an LSP scholarship in the first year of statewide expansion. The next section outlines the 
methodology used to study these topics. 
Methodology 
This section introduces our methodology for investigating differences in non-cognitive 
skills and political tolerance levels between students who were awarded and not awarded an LSP 
in the 2012-13 school year. We begin by describing the phone survey data collection process and 
                                                 
34 Wolf (2005) categorizes a finding as contingently positive if it reports statistically significant 
positive findings for a type of school rather than all schools. 
35 Interestingly, one study found that attending a secular or Catholic private school was beneficial 




then move on to a description of the primary non-cognitive and tolerance measures used in this 
study. The section concludes with description of the final sample of survey respondents as well 
as a comparison of our sample to the full population of eligible applicants in the first year of the 
program’s expansion statewide. 
Data collection 
Our study is based on the results of phone surveys of a selected subsample of the nearly 
10,000 LSP eligible applicants in the first year of the program’s expansion statewide. After first 
developing a survey incorporating several well-known scales designed to capture student non-
cognitive skills, our research team worked closely with an independent research group 
specializing in phone survey administration to complete data collection. Data collection began on 
November 18, 2014 and was concluded on February 7, 2015 after a total of 1,000 records were 
collected. 
Our research team provided the independent survey group with a randomly ordered list of 
LSP eligible applicants that was divided into two strata. The first strata consisted of students who 
received no exemptions in the LSP scholarship application process; whereas the second strata 
included students who had participated in the New Orleans pilot program and students with 
special education exemptions.36 These strata were ordered in the data to prioritize students who 
were not subject to exemptions in the LSP award process and therefore were more likely to have 
been randomly assigned to a scholarship placement in a private school or to the control group. 
                                                 
36 We excluded 159 students with severe disabilities from our call sample because their listed 
disabilities likely precluded their participation in the phone survey. Specifically, we excluded the 
following disability categories: Autism, Developmental Delay, Intellectual Disability (mild 




Upon contacting a household, surveyors first asked to speak with a parent or guardian to 
verify they had reached the intended family, describe the purpose of the study, and request 
consent to administer the survey to the child. After receiving consent, the surveyor asked to 
speak with the child, verified that the child’s name matched the name on the intended record37, 
and then administered the survey to the child38. In general, surveys lasted between 10 and 15 
minutes. At the conclusion of the survey, the surveyor asked to speak again with the student’s 
parent or guardian. The surveyor thanked the parent for their participation and provided the 
family with a toll-free number to call in case the family had any additional questions about the 
study. 
Our final survey sample consists of 99939 students, two thirds of whom received an LSP 
scholarship. This sample represents slightly more than 10 percent of the eligible applicants in the 
2012-13 school year. These data have been merged with administrative data on student 
achievement and demographics provided by the Louisiana Department of Education (LDE). In 
addition, we have supplemented these data with information on school-level characteristics 
publicly available through the National Center for Education Statistics’s Common Core of Data 
(CCD) and Private School Universe Survey (PSUS). 
Measures of non-cognitive skills and civic attitudes 
This section describes four measures of non-cognitive skills and civic attitudes that are 
the basis for our study. We have chosen the measures outlined in this section due to their use in 
                                                 
37 Several contacted households had more than one child in the LSP eligible applicant sample. In 
order to preserve the random ordering of the call list, surveyors validated that the child was the 
child of interest and explained to families that they may be receiving a call at a later point to 
interview the other children in the household. 
38 Parents were allowed to listen in as the survey was conducted if requested. Surveyors were 
asked to identify such records in the collected data. 
39 Our final analytical sample excludes one of the original 1,000 respondents because the child’s 




other studies of school choice. For example, Dobbie and Fyer (2014) and West and colleagues 
(2014) have included the Grit scale in evaluations of the effects of charter school attendance on 
student outcomes. Dobbie and Fryer (2014) additionally include the Locus-of-control and Self-
esteem scales. Finally, the Political Tolerance scale described in this section has been used in 
several studies of private schools (Wolf, 2005). 
In addition, there are a few features of our design and implementation of the scales 
described below which will likely add noise to our final results. For example, none of the scales 
used in this study have been validated for phone surveys, nor have they been validated in 
populations as young as the study sample. In addition, the research team made a small number of 
changes to some of the survey items after consulting with the independent survey group to 
improve language clarity.  
Finally, items were randomly ordered within instruments across individuals in an attempt 
to ensure that individual responses were not biased by the presentation order of questions. 
These notes aside, we proceed to a description of the scales used in our analysis. 
Grit. The first non-cognitive skill measured in this study is grit, or an individual’s 
“perseverance and passion for long-term goals” (Duckworth et al., 2007). Our measure of grit is 
based on the 8-item Short Grit Scale developed by Duckworth and Quinn (2012) that has been 
adapted for young children.40 An individual’s grit score is based on their average responses to 
eight five-point Likert scale items41 that include questions like “New ideas and projects 
sometimes distract me from previous ones” and “I am a hard worker”. 
                                                 
40 The adapted 8-item grit scale is available on Dr. Duckworth’s website: 
https://upenn.app.box.com/8itemgritchild 
41 Students are asked to choose among the following options: “Very much like you”, “Mostly 




Studies using different versions of the scale have found that grit is predictive of several 
positive outcomes. Duckworth et al. (2007) find that grit is positively associated with career 
stability in a sample of adults, positively related to GPA among undergraduates at an elite 
Northeastern university, is a better predictor of retention among West Point first years than either 
a measure of self-control or an assessment administered by West Point, and that individuals with 
higher grit scores were more likely to outlast their competitors in the National Spelling Bee. 
Furthermore, Duckworth and Quinn (2012) find that grit is positively related to student GPA, 
independent of IQ. On the other hand, two recent studies using the Grit scale in evaluations of 
charter schools have identified negative relationships between charter school attendance and Grit 
(Dobbie & Fryer, 2014; West et al., 2014). Both studies note, however, that the negative 
relationships may be driven in part by reference group bias resulting from differences in 
individual schooling environments. The Grit scale has a .53 internal reliability score across our 
whole sample, with a reported .52 for students in grades 2 through 6 and a reported .58 among 
students in grades 7 through 12. This is substantially lower than the generally accepted threshold 
of .75 for internal reliability scores (Croker & Aligna, 1986).  
In a separate section appearing after the Grit scale items, we included a series of vignettes 
describing fictitious individuals with different levels of Grit. While these vignettes have been 
used by some to attempt to address reference group bias (King, Murray, Salomon, & Tandon, 
2004; Zamarro, Vonkova, and DeBerg, 2014), we instead use individual responses to these 
vignettes in a robustness check designed to determine if reference group bias is present in our 
analysis. 
Locus of Control. The second scale included in our survey is the locus of control scale 




believes rewards are the result of their own actions. We record an individual’s locus of control 
based on their responses to six four-point Likert scale items.42 The specific items are taken from 
the High School and Beyond Third Follow-up (1986); and include questions like “Good luck is 
more important than hard work for success” and “Every time I try to get ahead, something or 
somebody stops me”. The Locus of Control scale has an internal reliability score of .47 across all 
phone survey respondents, with a .44 among students in grades 2-6 and a .54 among students in 
grades 7 through 12 at data collection. 
Self-esteem. We capture individual self-esteem levels using Rosenberg’s (1965) popular 
self-esteem scale. A respondent’s self-esteem score is calculated as their average response 
across10 four-point Likert scale items. Each of the 10 items are designed to capture an 
individual’s view of their self-worth; including questions like “I am able to do thinks as well as 
most other people” and “I certainly feel useless at times”. In a 2003 review of studies using the 
self-esteem scale, Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, and Vohs note that self-esteem is only 
moderately related to school performance, is a strong predictor of individual happiness, is 
associated with a stronger likelihood of speaking up in a group, among other findings. The 
reported internal reliability score is .77 for the Self-esteem scale across all respondents, with a 
.73 reported for students in grades 2 through 6 and a .83 reported for students in grades 7 through 
12. 
Political Tolerance. The final scale examined in this study attempts to capture 
participant civic attitudes by providing a measure of their political tolerance. The political 
tolerance protocol first asks individuals to identify a group that “has beliefs that [they] oppose 
the most” and then asks a series of questions regarding the level of political freedoms the 
                                                 





individual would allow this group to enjoy. For example, individuals are asked to indicate if they 
“Strongly Disagree”, “Disagree”, “[are] Neutral”, “Agree”, or “Strongly Agree” that “The 
government should be able to secretly listen in on the telephone conversations” of their least 
preferred group. Unlike the three previous scales, the political tolerance scale was only 
administered to students without disabilities in grades 5 through 10 at baseline43 due to the 
sensitive nature of the topic.44 In a 2005 review of the literature on private school choice and 
civic outcomes, Patrick Wolf notes that several studies have used this scale to compare political 
tolerance levels between public and private school students, largely finding higher levels of 
tolerance among private school students. The internal reliability score for this scale for this group 
of students is .77. 
Sample Description 
Data collection began in November of 2014 and continued for nearly four months until a 
sample of 999 records were collected. This group of respondents, representing slightly more than 
10 percent of all eligible LSP applicants in 2012, will provide the basis for our primary analysis. 
It is important to recognize that comparisons presented in this paper rely on a selected sample, 
based on the small number of families that opted into the phone survey. In particular, the small 
response rate raises some concerns that our results may not be representative of the broader 
population of eligible LSP applicants. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for several student characteristics collected at 
baseline for two groups of students: the students responding to our phone survey and all other 
                                                 
43 These students should be in grades 7 through 12 as the time of survey administration unless 
they were held back during the time period examined. 
44 In addition, the phone survey included a prompt before and during the questions noting, "If 
you are at all uncomfortable answering any of these questions, you may choose not to answer. 




eligible LSP applicants in 2012-13. The data presented in Table 1 is based either on student 
characteristics collected in the 2011-12 school year or from their application.45 
In general, the results presented in Table 1 do not suggest that the phone survey sample 
differs strongly from the population of eligible applicants. The survey respondent sample is 
slightly less likely to be African American and to be identified as Free- or Reduced-Price Lunch 
eligible relative to the population of eligible LSP applicants. In addition, survey respondents 
were slightly more likely to have applied for the program in third grade and slightly less likely to 
have applied in either seventh or eighth grade. The remaining differences, including those 
observed among students with achievement data in 2011-12, are fairly negligible. In particular, 
while students in both groups on average scored below the state average in all subjects, the two 
groups do not differ strongly in their observed performance. While there is no way to determine 
if the students differ from the general population of eligible applicants on unobservable 
dimensions, the similarly of the distributions presented in Table 1 suggests that such selection 
bias may not be a major concern for our analysis. 
  
                                                 
45 Student grade, for example, were collected from a student’s application--we would roughly 
expect these students to be two grades higher at the time of the survey if they were admitted to 
the grade applied for and progressed at a normal pace through grades. FRL and achievement data 
are only available for students in grades 3-7 who took either the iLEAP or LEAP exams. Finally, 
small percentage of students is missing data required to identify if they were living in a 














Diff. Std. Err. 
  N Mean   N Mean 
Female 999 0.53  8,530 0.50 0.02 0.02 
African American 999 0.84  8,530 0.87 -0.03** 0.01 
White 999 0.09  8,530 0.08 0.01 0.01 
Hispanic 999 0.03  8,530 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Free- or reduced-price lunch eligiblea 356 0.78  3,395 0.82 -0.04* 0.02 
Living in Metropolitan Statistical Areab 921 0.96  7,588 0.96 0.00 0.01 
School preferences listed 999 1.97  8,530 2.06 -0.09* 0.04 
Grade at application        
    Kindergarten 999 0.21  8,530 0.21 0.00 0.01 
    First 999 0.14  8,530 0.13 0.01 0.01 
    Second 999 0.11  8,530 0.11 0.01 0.01 
    Third 999 0.14  8,530 0.11 0.04*** 0.01 
    Fourth 999 0.09  8,530 0.10 -0.01 0.01 
    Fifth 999 0.09  8,530 0.08 0.01 0.01 
    Sixth 999 0.09  8,530 0.08 0.00 0.01 
    Seventh 999 0.05  8,530 0.08 -0.03*** 0.01 
    Eighth 999 0.04  8,530 0.05 -0.01** 0.01 
    Ninth 999 0.04  8,530 0.05 -0.01 0.01 
    Tenth 999 0.02  8,530 0.02 0.00 0.00 
Standardized state achievementc        
    Math 355 -0.51  3,330 -0.52 0.00 0.05 
    ELA 356 -0.45  3,328 -0.43 -0.02 0.05 
    Science 355 -0.54  3,322 -0.55 0.01 0.06 
    Social Studies 355 -0.46   3,322 -0.47 0.01 0.06 
*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10 
a. Student FRL status is only available for students appearing in the state’s testing data. 
b. Data on Metropolitan Statistical Area is taken from the American Community Survey. 
c. Student achievement data are restricted to students taking the standard state assessments (iLEAP or LEAP) in 
grades 3 through 7 in the 2011-12 school year.  
Note. Student achievement data has been standardized within subject and grade to the state’s testing distribution. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Results and Discussion 
In the following sections, we present the primary results from our analyses examining 
differences in measures of student non-cognitive skills and political tolerance; as well as a series 




here largely suggests that the two groups of students did not differ across any of the four 
measures of interest two years after initial LSP scholarship assignment. 
Primary observational analysis 
Table 2 presents pairwise correlations between the three non-cognitive skills measures, 
tolerance measure, and four estimates capturing student achievement growth between the 2011-
12 and 2012-13 school years.46 Panel A presents results for the full set of respondents with 
complete responses for all measures, excluding Political Tolerance; while Panel B presents 
results for a subset of students who additionally provided responses for the Political Tolerance 
scale.47 We include achievement scores gains in Table 1 to examine the relationship between the 
included non-cognitive skills measures and student achievement gains; however in doing so, we 
have substantially restricted the sample for which we can estimate these relationships. 
Nevertheless, the relationships observed in Table 1 among the non-cognitive skills measures 
generally hold in the full sample of survey respondents. 
In both Panel A and Panel B, the group of non-cognitive skills measures are strongly correlated 
with one another, as are the group of achievement gains measures. On the other hand, the two 
groups—non-cognitive skills and achievement gains—are not strongly correlated. These findings 
corroborate the work of West et al. (2014), who found significant, but very weak relationships 
between Grit and math and ELA achievement gains. Interestingly, Political Tolerance does not 
appear to be related to either Grit or Self-esteem (Panel B); but is significantly and positively 
related to Locus of Control. 
                                                 
46 Keeping in line with the work of West and colleagues (2014), we calculate mean performance 
gain as the average residual resulting from a regression of standardized achievement in 2012-13 
on a cubic function of achievement in 2011-12.  
47 Due to the sensitive nature of the items on the Political Tolerance survey, we only 
administered the scale to students in grades 7 through 12 in the fall of 2014 who did not indicate 























Panel A: Phone survey sample with complete responses (N=229) 
Locus of Control 0.43***       
Self-esteem 0.37*** 0.53***      
Political Tolerance --- --- ---     
Res. math gain -0.02 -0.02 -0.03     
Res. ELA gain 0.06 0.08 0.05 --- 0.46***   
Res. science gain 0.04 0.00 -0.02 --- 0.30*** 0.44***  
Res. social studies gain 0.09 -0.07 -0.03 --- 0.27*** 0.39*** 0.31*** 
Panel B: Including political tolerance (N=177) 
Locus of Control 0.47***       
Self-esteem 0.34*** 0.56***      
Political Tolerance -0.04 0.17** 0.09     
Res. math gain -0.07 -0.05 -0.09 0.03    
Res. ELA gain 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.40***   
Res. science gain 0.10 0.07 -0.05 -0.03 0.28*** 0.39***  
Res. social studies gain 0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.11 0.21*** 0.42*** 0.32*** 
*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10 
Note. Samples restricted to students with complete responses across all measures. 





Before moving on to more complex analysis, it is helpful to examine the raw distributions 
of our measures between students awarded an LSP scholarship and those not awarded to get a 
sense of how the two groups compare. Figure 1 separately plots kernel density estimates of the 
distributions for each of our four measures for students awarded and not awarded an LSP in 
2012-13. While the plots in Figure 1 do not control for student demographics and achievement, 
they are nevertheless informative. In particular, the similarity between the two distributions in 
each graph is quite striking, suggesting little differences between the two groups. This is 
confirmed by Kolmogrov-Smirnov tests, which fail to reject the null of similar distributions in 
each case (Grit: p = .29; Locus of Control: p = .35; Self-esteem: p = .41; Political Tolerance: p = 
.55). 
In general, the results presented in Figure 1 do not suggest strong differences in non-
cognitive skills and political tolerance between the two groups of students after two years of 
potential program participation. Nevertheless, these findings are based on simple comparisons 
between the two groups. Next, we examine whether the null findings presented in Figure 1 
persist when controlling for observational differences between the two groups using multiple 
regression analysis. 
Tables 3 and 4 present results of regression models designed to improve model precision 
by controlling for various baseline characteristics. Table 3 presents results for models focusing 
on Grit and Locus of Control and Table 4 presents models focusing on Self-esteem and Political 
Tolerance. In both tables, columns 1 and 4 present simple models analogous to the distributional 





Figure 1. Kernel density estimated distributions of non-cognitive skills and tolerance measures 
comparing students receiving an LSP scholarship and those who did not receive a scholarship. 
 
with fixed effects for grade and the number of school preferences offered at application.48 
Columns 3 and 6 additionally include controls for student math and ELA achievement in the 
2011-12 school year. These analyses are limited to the subset of students in our sample who took 
either the Louisiana LEAP or iLEAP exam in grades 3 through 7 in that year. 
In general, the results presented in Tables 3 and 4 suggest limited differences between 
students receiving and not receiving an LSP scholarship on all measures. Even after controlling 
for several baseline covariates, the general story of insignificant differences between the two 
                                                 
48 Families could offer up to 5 school preferences on their application. In order to control for 
unobservable differences between families offering more or fewer school preferences, we 




groups suggested in Figure 1 persists. At the same time, it is important to note that the results 
presented in Tables 3 and 4 are quite noisy. The reported standard errors--especially for the LSP 
award identifier--are fairly large across all models, typically equal in magnitude to the coefficient 
estimate itself. Similarly, while overall model precision generally improves with the inclusion of 
additional covariates, all models perform quite poorly in parsing away error variance as none of 
the adjusted R-squared values surpass .09. While we expected somewhat noisy results, given the 
lack of studies validating the included scales via phone surveys or in samples of children as 
young as some of those included in our sample, the results presented in Tables 3 and 4 do not 
give us strong confidence in these models. 
Finally, an examination of the estimated coefficients for the baseline covariates in Tables 
3 and 4 reveals some interesting relationships in our sample. For example, females report higher 
levels of GRIT, but do not differ substantially from males on the remaining measures. Moving in  
the last two years is associated with lower levels of Grit and Self-esteem, but higher levels of 
Political Tolerance. Finally, student achievement has little predictive value for the set of non-
cognitive skills measures; however students with higher baseline math achievement appear to be 
less tolerant than other students and students with higher baseline ELA achievement appear to be 
relatively more tolerant. 
In summary, the results presented in this section do not suggest that students awarded an 
LSP scholarship differed from students who did not receive a scholarship on measures of non-
cognitive skills and political tolerance two years later. These results hold both in sample 
comparisons of scholarship receipt status, as well as in more complex analyses controlling for 







Regression adjusted relationships between Grit and Locus of Control and LSP scholarship 
receipt 
  GRIT   Locus of Control 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
LSP Awarded 0.04 -0.02 0.01  0.06 0.04 0.04 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.07)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
Female  0.14*** 0.06   0.00 -0.05 
  (0.04) (0.07)   (0.04) (0.06) 
Black  0.09 0.31   0.24* 0.41* 
  (0.10) (0.27)   (0.13) (0.24) 
White  -0.11 -0.14   0.17 0.15 
  (0.12) (0.30)   (0.15) (0.25) 
Hispanic  0.27* 0.31   0.33** 0.48 
  (0.15) (0.32)   (0.17) (0.29) 
Special Ed  -0.23** -0.69***   -0.11 -0.16 
  (0.11) (0.18)   (0.10) (0.19) 
Moved  -0.10** -0.10   0.03 0.09 
  (0.05) (0.09)   (0.04) (0.07) 
Mom's education        
    Finished high school  0.12 -0.11   -0.03 -0.10 
  (0.11) (0.15)   (0.11) (0.10) 
    Went to college but did not finish  0.21* -0.05   0.12 0.07 
  (0.11) (0.15)   (0.11) (0.10) 
    Finished college  0.18 -0.08   0.05 0.08 
  (0.11) (0.15)   (0.11) (0.10) 
Std. math achievement, 2011-12   0.05    0.05 
   (0.05)    (0.05) 
Std. ELA achievement, 2011-12   0.02    0.07 
   (0.05)    (0.05) 
Grade FE  X X   X X 
Choices offered FE  X X   X X 
N 999 924 330  999 924 330 
Adj. R-squared 0.00 0.04 0.06   0.00 0.04 0.09 
*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10 
Note. Math and ELA achievement has been standardized to the state testing distribution by grade for students taking 
the iLEAP or LEAP exams in grades 3 through 7 in 2011-12. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are presented 
in parentheses. 







Regression adjusted relationships between Self-esteem and Political Tolerance and LSP 
scholarship receipt 
  Self-esteem   Political Tolerance 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
LSP Awarded 0.03 -0.03 0.00  0.08 0.05 0.11 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)  (0.09) (0.11) (0.13) 
Female  0.02 0.01   -0.05 -0.12 
  (0.03) (0.05)   (0.10) (0.11) 
Black  0.13* 0.25*   0.05 0.06 
  (0.07) (0.13)   (0.16) (0.25) 
White  0.03 0.06   -0.19 -0.07 
  (0.09) (0.15)   (0.23) (0.31) 
Hispanic  0.21** 0.39**   -0.06 -0.03 
  (0.09) (0.16)   (0.44) (0.47) 
Special Ed  -0.15* -0.26**     
  (0.08) (0.11)     
Moved  -0.09** 0.00   0.18* 0.13 
  (0.04) (0.06)   (0.11) (0.11) 
Mom's education        
    Finished high school  0.00 0.00   -0.12 -0.17 
  (0.08) (0.11)   (0.17) (0.22) 
    Went to college but did not finish  0.07 0.06   -0.18 -0.23 
  (0.07) (0.11)   (0.16) (0.21) 
    Finished college  0.06 0.18*   0.00 -0.01 
  (0.07) (0.10)   (0.15) (0.20) 
Std. Math   0.04    -0.25*** 
   (0.04)    (0.08) 
Std. Math   -0.02    0.25*** 
   (0.04)    (0.09) 
Grade FE  X X   X X 
Choices offered FE  X X   X X 
N 999 924 330  247 238 211 
Adj. R-squared 0.00 0.08 0.09   0.00 -0.01 0.04 
*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10 
Note. Math and ELA achievement has been standardized to the state testing distribution by grade for students taking 
the iLEAP or LEAP exams in grades 3 through 7 in 2011-12. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are presented 
in parentheses. 






The results presented thus far suggest that receiving an LSP scholarship was not related 
to student non-cognitive skills and levels of political tolerance among students participating in 
the first year of the program’s statewide implementation. In this section, we present two analyses 
designed to check the robustness of our findings. First, we examine if the estimated relationships 
hold in the subsample of students whose scholarship award was determined by binding 
lotteries.49 Next we investigate the extent to which reference group bias may be present in our 
Grit scale results. In general, we find limited evidence of different results in our subsample of 
LSP applicants participating in binding lotteries as well as little evidence suggesting response 
bias is of concern in our study. 
Focusing on subsample of phone survey respondents who participated in binding 
lotteries. Our first robustness check examines if the null results identified in the observational 
analyses presented in the preceding section hold among a subsample of phone survey 
participants whose LSP scholarship award was determined by a binding lottery. As is detailed in 
Chapter 1, LSP scholarships were awarded to students through a matching algorithm designed to 
take into account student school preferences as well as a set of priorities established by the 
Louisiana Department of Education (LDE). While all students were subject to the matching 
algorithm, LSP scholarships were only awarded by lottery in cases when there were more 
students applying in the same priority category than seats available to the same grade in the same 
school. Thus, as a first check of the robustness of the null results presented in Tables 3 and 4, we 
examine the extent to which these findings persist in the subsample of eligible applicants 
participating in binding lotteries. By focusing on binding lotteries, we will be limiting our 
                                                 




sample; however we will be providing a better control for unmeasurable factors driving selection 
into private schooling. While we should not expect to find substantially different results in this 
group, such a finding would raise concerns regarding our primary analyses. 
Our focus on binding lotteries requires a change in the model used to estimate differences 
in students receiving and not receiving an LSP scholarship. Specifically, we employ a similar 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) model to that presented in Chapter 1 which allows an estimation 
of the effect of LSP usage on the non-cognitive skill and tolerance measures of interest. In 
particular, we first predict the likelihood that a student enrolls in a private school using their LSP 
scholarship lottery outcome as a predictor along with a series of controls for demographics, 
baseline achievement, and individual risk set. This predicted usage variable is used as a 
substitute for observed usage in a model predicting one of the given dependent variables: Grit, 
Locus of Control, Self-esteem, and Political Tolerance. The specific 2SLS model is: 
 
1. 𝐸𝑖 = ∑𝜋𝑗𝑅𝑗𝑖 + 𝛿𝑇𝑖 + 𝑿𝜷 + 𝑨𝝆 + 𝑢𝑖 
2. 𝑌𝑖 = ∑𝛼𝑗𝑅𝑗𝑖 + 𝜏𝐸?̂? + 𝑿𝜸 + 𝑨𝜽 + 𝜖𝑖 
Where: 
 R is a fixed effect for a student’s first choice school lottery or “risk set” 
 E is a variable indicating if a student used an LSP scholarship to enroll in a private school 
 T is a variable indicating if a student received an LSP scholarship to their first choice 
school 
 Y is one of the four outcome measures of interest in this study: Grit, Locus of Control, 




 X is a vector of student demographics50 
 A is a vector of variables capturing student achievement in 2011-1251 
 
Table 5 presents the results of the 2SLS estimations of the differences between LSP 
scholarship users and other students on our non-cognitive skills and political tolerance measures. 
Column 1 presents results for simple models that only include risk set fixed effects; column 2 
provides the results from specifications that additionally control for student demographics; and 
column 3 presents results for models additionally controlling for student baseline achievement. 
The latter models are restricted to the subset of students who took the Louisiana state 
assessments in grades 3 through 7 in 2011-12. Across all models, the results from first stage 
regressions suggest winning an LSP scholarship is highly predictive of use: LSP winners, on 
average, are over .85 percentage points more likely to enroll in a private school across all 
models; and the reported joint-F statistics meet Staiger and Stock’s (1997) recommended 
threshold of 10. 
The results presented in Table 5 do not strongly differ from those presented in Tables 3 
and 4: students using an LSP scholarship to their first choice school do not differ for the most 
part from other students in nearly every model. The lone exception is that we find that LSP 
scholarship users on average report significantly higher scores on the Locus of Control scale in a 
model accounting for lotteries, student demographics, and student baseline achievement scores. 
This finding is somewhat surprising, given the overall insignificant results observed for the 
companion model presented in Table 4. 
Table 5 
                                                 
50 Demographic controls include gender, race/ethnicity, an indicator of student mobility, 
mother’s education, and variables capturing the number of school preferences offered at 
application. 
51 Regressions including student achievement are restricted to students who took the iLEAP or 





Student-level relationships between non-cognitive skills and tolerance and LSP scholarship 
receipt in binding lotteries 
 
  without covariates + demographic controls + student achievement 
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Grit 0.05 -0.02 0.12 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.16) 
Locus of Control 0.04 0.03 0.18* 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) 
Self-esteem -0.06 -0.09 -0.02 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.12) 
Model summary    
    N 639 587 202 
    Risk sets 280 264 105 
    First stage joint F 974.3 78.6 23.8 
    
Political tolerance 0.00 -0.08 -0.03 
 (0.20) (0.23) (0.27) 
    
    N 157 150 136 
    Risk sets 83 79 76 
    First stage joint F 229.3 17.9 16.4 
*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10 
Note. All models include risk set fixed effects. Across all models, winning an LSP scholarship is highly predictive of 
use: all estimated coefficients on LSP awarded are over .85 and have reported p-values of less than .001. 
Source. Authors’ calculations 
 
There are at least two reasons for this discrepancy. First, it is important to note that the 
focus on binding lotteries, in addition to the requirement of baseline achievement data in the 
model in question, restricts the sample on which this result is based (sample size of 202 
compared to a sample size of 330 in the primary analysis). In addition, it is important to 
recognize that the results presented in Table 5 are based on local average treatment effects—or 
the estimated effects of LSP usage for those students whose treatment assignment influences 
their take up. In contrast, the observational analyses presented in Table 3 estimate relationships 




significant finding for Locus of Control, the generally insignificant results presented in Table 5 
generally corroborate the insignificant findings presented in Tables 3 and 4. 
Reference group bias and the Grit scale. Two recent analyses of charter schools 
(Dobbie & Fryer, 2014; West et al., 2014) have provided evidence suggesting that observed 
differences in levels of Grit among charter school students may be explained by students facing 
school environments with higher behavioral expectations. In both cases, reference group bias 
was motivated by divergent findings between the included non-cognitive skills measures and 
other positive outcomes.52 In contrast, our results largely suggest insignificant differences 
between the two groups of students after two years. It is possible, however, that reference group 
bias has potentially played a role in the observed findings: with a positive or negative shift 
occurring that may exactly offset any gains or losses associated with the program. While this 
seems unlikely, we explore this possibility in regards to Grit. 
King et al. (2004) note that reference group bias has long been an important issue facing 
survey data. In particular, individuals in different groups may potentially respond differently to 
the same set of questions because their group-based experiences have led them to comprehend 
the same question in different ways. Naumann and John (2013), for example, compare 
conscientiousness ratings with undergraduate GPAs in a sample of Anglo-American and Asian-
American undergraduates at UC Berkley. In general, they find Anglo-American undergraduates 
reporting significantly higher conscientiousness scores than Asian-American students while also 
posting lower GPAs on average; however this relationship disappears when the researchers asked 
                                                 
52 Dobbie and Fryer (2014), for example, find large positive effect estimates for achievement and 
significant negative findings on the Grit scale. West et al. (2014), find positive relationships 




students to compare themselves to an explicit reference group (eg: "a typical Asian-American 
student"). 
We incorporated a series of vignettes designed to capture the construct of Grit in our 
survey in order to explore the extent to which reference bias could be an issue in our study.53 
Specifically, survey participants were asked to respond if the individual in the following 
vignettes was “Very much like [the participant]”, “Mostly like [the participant]”, “Somewhat like 
[the participant]”, “Not much like [the participant]”, or “Not like [the participant] at all”: 
1. Collin almost never finishes his homework. He stops working on a problem to watch TV 
or to play with his friends. How much like you is Collin? 
2. Riley always gets his homework done, even if he has to stay up late or avoid playing with 
his friends. He even spends a lot of time trying to answer hard questions that confuse 
him. How much like you is Riley? 
By asking individuals the extent to which they self-identified with the vignettes, we are 
unable to use these responses as anchors in an attempt to address selection bias (King et al., 
2004). On the other hand, by examining the distribution of responses to these vignettes between 
students who received an LSP and those who did not, we can use their responses to establish the 
extent to which reference bias may be an issue in our study. For example, if we were to find LSP 
awardees with low Grit scores tend to strongly identify with Collin (least gritty) while students 
who do not win a scholarship tend not to identify with Collin, there would be evidence 
suggesting that the two groups are judging themselves according to different standards. More 
                                                 
53 In their 2004 paper, King and colleagues develop a method to address potential reference 
group bias by using individual responses to a series of vignettes on the topic to adjust an 
individual’s responses to account for their differing environments. As the authors note, “the idea 
is to recode the categorical self-assessment relative to the set of vignettes.” (p. 195) This method 
is growing in popularity among researchers administering surveys across many groups of 




generally, large differences in distributions of responses to these vignettes between LSP 
receivers and non-receivers with similar Grit scores would be indicative of reference group bias. 
Table 6 compares the distribution of responses between LSP scholarship receivers and non-
receivers for the most and least gritty survey respondents. Panel A focuses on the least gritty 
students—or those in the bottom quartile of observed Grit scores—and Panel B focuses on the 
most gritty students—those in the top quartile of Grit scores. For each group, we present the 
distribution of responses to the “least gritty” vignette (Collin) and the “most gritty” vignette 
(Riley). Differences in the response distributions between the students receiving and not 
receiving LSP scholarships would provide evidence suggestive of a response bias effect. In 
contrast, we observe little evidence of divergent distributions in Table 6. 
The distributions in Panel B (student with the highest Grit scores) for the most part are 
shifted in the expected direction: both groups of students strongly identify with Riley (most 
gritty) and rarely identify with Collin (least gritty). The distributions for students with the lowest 
reported Grit scores, in contrast, are relatively flatter. Somewhat surprisingly, a large percentage 
of both LSP awardees and non-awardees indicate that they are very unlike Collin (least gritty). 
This potentially highlights the need to be wary of social desirability bias when examining survey 
response data (Paulhus, 1991). Nevertheless, the most important feature of Table 6 is that the 
distributions of responses between students who received an LSP scholarship and those who did 
not receive a scholarship do not differ strongly across all models. This is confirmed with Chi-
square tests of distributional independence, which fail to reject the null hypotheses in almost 
every case. The lone exception for responses to the least gritty vignette (Collin) students with the 









Distribution of responses to vignettes among top and bottom quartile of LSP scholarship awardees and non-awardees 









"Not like me 
at all" 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: Bottom Grit quartile 
Collin - Least Gritty 
Not awarded LSP 53 25% 8% 21% 17% 30% 
Awarded LSP 150 11% 11% 23% 8% 47% 
        
Riley - Most Gritty 
Not awarded LSP 53 26% 17% 32% 8% 17% 
Awarded LSP 150 33% 23% 24% 7% 13% 
        
Panel B: Top Grit quartile 
Collin - Least Gritty 
Not awarded LSP 74 1% 0% 8% 11% 80% 
Awarded LSP 188 1% 0% 7% 7% 86% 
        
Riley - Most Gritty 
 
Not awarded LSP 74 72% 12% 15% 1% 0% 
Awarded LSP 188 68% 15% 9% 3% 6% 
Note. Chi-square tests of independence of distributions fail to reject the null hypothesis in all but one case: students scoring in the bottom Grit quartile responses 
to the least gritty vignette (Collin) are significantly different at the 5 percent level (𝜒2(4)=11.5, p = .02). 





(𝜒2(4)=11.5, p = .02). Thus, while other studies have suggested that reference group bias may 
influence survey-based measures of student non-cognitive skills, we find little evidence that our 
earlier analyses suffer from such bias in our data. 
Conclusion 
The results presented in this paper represent the first attempt to examine differences in 
non-cognitive skills and political tolerance in a private school voucher program. In general, our 
findings do not suggest that students who were awarded an LSP scholarship differed 
significantly from students who did not receive a scholarship award two years after initial 
assignment on scales measuring individual Grit, Locus of Control, Self-esteem, and Political 
Tolerance. These findings are robust to several alternative specifications; and we furthermore 
find little evidence suggestive of reference group bias. 
This research comes at an important time for the evaluation of educational interventions. 
Non-cognitive measures are increasingly being used in education evaluations (Dobbie & Fryer, 
2014; Tough, 2012; West et al. 2014); however researchers continue to recommend caution in 
expanding their use in policy evaluation citing the possibility of reference bias and other issues 
that may produce misleading results (Dobbie & Fryer, 2014; Duckworth & Yaeger, 2015; West 
et al. 2014). While we do not find strong evidence of reference group bias in our results, we 
nevertheless highlight several caveats that should be taken into account when analyzing our 
findings. First, it is important to note that these findings are based on a subset of individuals 
volunteering to participate in the phone survey, ultimately representing little more than 10 
percent of eligible applicants in 2012. While we present evidence indicating that survey 
participants do not differ strongly from the full population of LSP applicants, we cannot rule out 




and perhaps most importantly, we again note that the scales used in this analysis have been 
validated neither for use in a phone survey nor in samples of children as young as some of those 
included in our survey. As we argue in the results section, these factors likely play a non-trivial 
role in the relatively large amounts of noise observed in our models. 
Nevertheless, we believe this paper advances the knowledgebase on the effects of private 
school choice programs on participating students by providing the first comparison of non-
cognitive skills and political tolerance measures in a school voucher program. With a growing 
research base demonstrating the important role of non-cognitive skills in lifelong outcomes, as 
well as a long standing view of the important role of education in developing civic skills, it is 
important for future evaluations of choice programs to explore outcomes beyond achievement 
and attainment. At the same time, we caution future researchers to take into account the potential 
threats to analysis of survey response bias, reference group bias, and issues that may inflate error 
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In February 2010, President Obama argued for a shift in focus in the reauthorization of 
the ESEA towards a K-12 education system geared at ensuring career- and college-readiness 
(The White House, 2010). More recently, President Obama has set a vision for America to have 
the highest proportion of college graduates in the world by 2020.55 This focus on college success 
is merited, as economists Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz (2008) argue that America’s higher 
education system has played a pivotal role in America’s emergence as one of the leading 
economies in the world. A number of policies have been developed over the last half-century to 
increase college access and success. These policies include federal aid programs such as the GI 
Bill for military veterans and the Pell Grant program for low-income families. 
Enrollment in higher education and degree completion has dramatically increased 
recently. According to the US Department of Education, the percentage of 18- to 24-year-olds 
enrolled in a degree-granting institution has increased from 36 percent in 2001 to 41 percent in 
2012 (Snyder, 2014). Meanwhile, the percentage of 25-to 29-year-olds who have earned at least 
a bachelor’s degree has increased from 28 percent in 2003 to 34 percent in 2013 (National Center 
for Education Statistics, 2014). 
Nevertheless, while college access and graduation rates have improved over the last half-
century, these improvements have not been experienced equally among all segments of the 
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population. Disparities along demographic characteristics such as income and race remain. A 
recent Pell Institute (2015) report found that while the college access gap between the richest and 
poorest American families has dropped significantly since the 1970s, there remains a sizeable 
gap in bachelor’s degree completion. Specifically, while over 90 percent of students entering 
colleges from the highest income families completed a 4-year degree, only 21 percent of low-
income family college entrants completed college in 2012. Likewise, by 2013, 40 percent of 
White 25- to 29-year olds have earned at least a bachelor’s degree. Yet only 21 and 16 percent of 
their Black and Hispanic counterparts have done the same. 
A number of policies aim to improve both the rate at which individuals attend college and 
the rate of successful completion. For example, recent research suggests that simple “nudges” 
can improve the rate at which individuals matriculate and persist in college. Castleman and Page 
(2013) find that college intending high school graduates randomly assigned to receive text 
message reminders of important college enrollment deadlines were significantly more likely to 
matriculate in college than their counterparts who did not receive the texts. Similarly, Castleman 
and Page (2014) find that freshman at two-year community colleges who were randomly 
assigned to receive text messages reminding them about renewing their financial aid were 
significantly more likely to remain enrolled through their sophomore year of college. In addition, 
Bettinger, Long, Oreopoulos, and Sanbonmatsu (2012) found that students of families randomly 
assigned assistance in completing a FAFSA application were more likely to attend and persist in 
college than students in families who did not receive assistance. Nevertheless, while these 
studies suggest simple nudges may be effective, the most prevalent policy aimed at increasing 




Financial aid for higher education can work to improve college attendance by reducing 
the cost of college (Dynarski, 2008). Indeed, the cost of higher education has significantly risen 
over the past decade. In constant 2011-2012 dollars, the price for tuition, room, and board at 
public four-year institutions increased from $12,000 in 2001 to $17,000 to 2011. Prices for 
private four-year institutions rose from $29,000 to $34,000 over the same period (National 
Center for Education Statistics, 2014). Unsurprisingly, over 80 percent of students in four-year 
institutions between 2008 and 2012 reported receiving some type of financial aid (National 
Center for Education Statistics, 2014). 
Aid can take several forms, but the most prevalent are loans and grants (College Board, 
2013). Whereas loans provide funds upfront for later payments, grant aid represents a direct 
financial subsidy from the perspective of the recipient (College Board, 2013). In the 2012-13 
school year, Federal loans and grants accounted for 61 percent of total aid received by 
undergraduate students. Institutional grants constituted another 19 percent of total aid received. 
In contrast, state grants accounted for only 5% of total aid (College Board, 2013). The majority 
of grant aid has a need-based component (over 70%), but several states have grant aid programs 
with eligibility requirements largely linked to student performance on standardized college 
readiness assessments and high school performance. In this paper, we examine the effectiveness 
of one such program, the Arkansas Academic Challenge Scholarship (ACS), in improving 
student outcomes in college. 
As Cornwell, Lee, and Mustard (2005) note, there are at least three motivations for states 
to offer merit-aid programs: (1) increasing college enrollment, (2) incentivizing high performing 
high schoolers to stay in state, and (3) promoting and rewarding academic achievement. 




student outcomes through two channels. First, by reducing the cost of college access, merit 
scholarships could help to minimize non-academic stresses in students’ lives which could then 
translate into higher achievement. Second, merit-scholarships may improve outcomes by directly 
incentivizing students to maximize behaviors that are associated with college success. For 
example, ACS requires students to maintain a GPA of 2.5 while enrolling in at least 15 credit 
hours a semester in order to continue qualifying for the program. Such requirements may 
incentivize individuals at the margin to work harder to meet their GPA requirements in order to 
continue receiving ACS. As of 2012, 14 states offered merit-based scholarships with eligibility 
requirements covering a large portion of high school graduates (Scott-Clayton, 2012). This 
number does not include state programs with more rigorous academic requirements—such as 
Missouri’s Bright Flight scholarship which provides scholarships to the top 3 percent of ACT 
test takers in the state. 
While state financed merit-aid programs have been around since the 1980s, these 
programs largely came under empirical scrutiny in the early 2000s due to the increased 
availability of administrative data. Largely relying on empirical techniques exploiting abrupt 
policy changes or strong institutional knowledge of program award mechanisms, researchers 
have found such programs to improve the likelihood of college attendance (Cornwell, Mustard, 
and Sridhar, 2006; Dynarski, 2003; Kane, 2003; Scott-Clayton, 2012), persistence (Bettinger, 
2004), cumulative GPA (Scott-Clayton, 2012), and likelihood of graduation (Dynarski, 2008; 
Scott-Clayton, 2012). At the same time, research examining these programs has not reported 
consistently positive findings. For example, Cornwell, Lee, and Mustard (2005) find a decreased 
likelihood of taking a full-time course load and an increased likelihood in enrollment in summer 




HOPE scholarship program. In addition, while Scott-Clayton (2012) finds that West Virginia’s 
PROMISE scholarship positively influenced entrance and graduation rates, she finds no 
significant impacts on four-year college persistence. Finally, several studies have found that the 
positive effects of state-funded merit-aid programs are largely concentrated around the 
programs’ eligibility thresholds (Cornwell, Lee, and Mustard, 2005; Scott-Clayton, 2012).  
This paper follows in the vein of prior studies utilizing knowledge of the assignment 
policy to examine the effects of the Arkansas Academic Challenge Scholarship (ACS) on student 
outcomes. Specifically, we use administrative data on current college students who became 
eligible for the ACS because of their academic credentials to estimate the effects of receiving the 
scholarship on short- and long-term college outcomes via regression discontinuity design. This 
study contributes to the literature on state-based merit scholarships for three reasons. First, while 
prior research has largely focused on the effects of merit-aid programs on entering freshman, we 
examine how receipt of the ACS affected college outcomes for students who were currently 
enrolled in college at the introduction of the program (hereafter referred to as “current students”). 
While we intend to examine the effects of the ACS on student outcomes for entering freshman 
cohorts in future iterations of this research, the current paper nevertheless adds to the literature 
by providing insight into how merit-aid policies affect students in the short-run. In addition, by 
focusing on students who were currently enrolled in college at the time of the program's 
expansion, as opposed to incoming Freshman, our study represents the first attempt to estimate 
the motivational effects of a merit-aid scholarship on student outcomes that is unaffected by any 
motivational effects occurring prior to enrollment in college.56 Second, and perhaps most 
importantly, this paper compliments exiting research by focusing on a program with relatively 
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low eligibility requirements. In particular, while other programs impose eligibility requirements 
covering up to 40 percent of in-state college enrollees (Scott-Clayton, 2012), the students 
maintaining a 2.5 cumulative college GPA and continuously enrolled are eligible for the ACS 
scholarship. Finally, given the mixed findings of exiting research on state-financed merit-aid, our 
analysis benefits the literature by examining the effects of such programs in a new state and 
program context. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the following section, we provide a 
more detailed description of the Arkansas Academic Challenge Scholarship. Next, we outline the 
quasi-experimental strategy and data we use to estimate the effects of the ACS on college 
outcomes. We then move on to our primary findings and a series of robustness checks. Finally, 
we conclude with a discussion of our findings and their implications. 
The Arkansas Academic Challenge Scholarship 
In November of 2008, Arkansas voters approved the first statewide lottery in Arkansas: 
the Arkansas Scholarship Lottery. Proceeds from the lottery were used to dramatically expand 
the existing Arkansas Academic Challenge Scholarship Program. Arkansas Scholarship Lottery 
tickets first went on sale in the fall of 2009; and the first round of lottery-funded scholarships 
were awarded to students in the fall of 2010 (Arkansas Department of Higher Education, 2010). 
The goal of the ACS is “to provide meaningful financial help to those qualifying” 
(Arkansas Secretary of State, 2011). When the program was first enacted, the ACS provided 
relatively generous scholarships of $5,000 to students attending 4-year colleges.57 As is shown in 
Table 1, the award amounts have changed over time to account for changing revenue streams for 
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the lottery and the increasing application rate in recent years. To date, the Arkansas Scholarship 




ACS award payouts by cohort year 
Year First Awarded 4 Year School 2 Year School 
2010-11 $5000 $2500 
2011-12 $4500 $2250 
2012-13 $4500 $2250 
2013-14 $2000 (1st year) $2000 
2013-14 $3000 (2nd year) $2000 
2013-14 $4000 (3rd year) $2000 
2013-14 $5000 (4th year) $2000 
Source: Arkansas Department of Higher Education (http://scholarships.adhe.edu/scholarships-and-programs/a-z) 
 
At its inception—and the period under scrutiny in this analysis—there were three 
categories of students eligible for the ACS. 
1. Students who received the ACS prior to the fall of 2010 (“Prior Recipients”) 
2. First-time freshman entering college in the fall of 2010 or afterwards (“Traditional 
Recipients”) 
3. Students who entered college before the fall of 2010 as first-time freshman who were 
continuously enrolled in consecutive semesters prior to the fall of 2010 (“Current 
Achiever Recipients”) 
In this paper, we focus on estimating the impacts of ACS on college outcomes for the 
final category of eligible students: Current Achievers. To be eligible for the ACS, Current 
Achievers had to satisfy several requirements. First, they had to fill out a Free Application for 
Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) application. Second, they had to be continuously enrolled for at 
                                                 




least 12 hours each semester since their freshman year. Finally, Current Achievers had to have a 
cumulative GPA of 2.5 at the time of their application for the program. As we describe in the 
following section, we leverage detailed data on students at a large Arkansas university during 
this time period as well as knowledge of the strict eligibility requirements for students to 
examine the effects of the ACS on Current Achiever college outcomes using a regression 
discontinuity design. 
While our analysis focuses on the final category of students, it is important to point out 
that the requirements for Traditional Recipients of the ACS are particularly low among state-
based merit scholarships. In particular, Traditional Recipients must [a] complete a FAFSA, [b] 
have a high school GPA of 2.5 or higher, and [c] scored a 19 or higher on the ACT (or achieved 
an equivalent score on another college readiness assessment) (Arkansas Secretary of State, 
2011). In the future, we intend to expand on the current analysis by examining the effects of 
ACS receipt on students around these relatively low performance thresholds. 
Method 
Our goal is to estimate the impacts of receiving the Arkansas Academic Challenge 
Scholarship (ACS) on college-going outcomes for students who were currently enrolled in 
college during the expansion of the program in the fall of 2010. As Dynarski (2008) notes, it is 
generally challenging to estimate the causal effects of financial aid on college enrollment, 
persistence, and attainment because of the likely unobservable factors influencing these 
outcomes. Fortunately, ACS’s strict eligibility criteria for Current Achievers—full-time 
enrollment and cumulative GPA of 2.5—allows us to estimate the causal impact of the program 




knowledge of the program’s eligibility requirements in a regression discontinuity design (Kane, 
2003; Scott-Clayton, 2012; van der Klaauw, 2002). 
In this section, we describe the data and analytical strategy used to estimate ACS impacts 
on college outcomes. In addition, we provide initial graphical analyses supporting our RDD 
method. 
Before moving on to a description of our data and analytical strategy, it is important to 
highlight the following points. First, while the ACS uses strict eligibility requirements to allocate 
scholarships, students were still required to apply for an ACS. Thus, we estimate ACS impacts 
using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design (FRDD) by first predicting the likelihood of 
receiving an ACS given one’s eligibility status. Second, while the dual eligibility requirements 
allow for comparisons of several types of ACS receivers and non-receivers, our primary analysis 
focuses exclusively on a comparison of individuals who have met the full-time enrollment 
qualification. 
Data 
We estimate the impacts of the ACS on college outcomes using detailed administrative 
data on students at a large Arkansas university (LAU). These data include student level 
demographics, high school qualifications, information on credit accumulation, cumulative GPA, 
and major by semester, and family financial data. 
While our data include information on all students enrolled at LAU by freshman cohort-
year, our analysis examines a restricted sample of students. First, because we are interested in 
ACS impacts on Current Achievers, we focus on students entering as freshman in years 2007-08 
through 2009-10. Students in these cohorts would be entering their senior, junior, and sophomore 




restrict our analysis to students identified as applying to LAU from within Arkansas as out-of-
state applicants are not eligible for the scholarship. Finally, we restrict our sample to students 
who filled out a FAFSA at the time of their initial application because, while the ACS does not 
have a set income threshold, students are still required to submit a FAFSA to be eligible for the 
program.59 After making these selections, we are left with an analytical sample comprising 331 
students from cohort year 2007-08, 464 from cohort year 2008-09, and 745 from cohort year 
2009-10. 
Analytical strategy 
This section introduces our analytical strategy for estimating the effects of the Arkansas 
Academic Challenge Scholarship on college outcomes. Our broad goal is to utilize the eligibility 
requirements of the ACS to estimate the program’s impact on Current Achievers—or students 
who were already enrolled at LAU in the fall of 2010. In this section, we describe the particular 
comparison group used to estimate the ACS’s effects, outline the fuzzy regression discontinuity 
model used to estimate those effects, and describe the specific sample under scrutiny in our 
analysis. 
Selecting a comparison group. The ACS eligibility criteria for Current Achievers are 
suggestive of a dual discontinuity in qualification status. Specifically, Current Achievers are 
eligible for the ACS if they met the continuing full-time enrollment requirement (enrolled at least 
12 hours in each semester since their initial matriculation) and the cumulative GPA requirement 
(2.5 GPA). The dual nature of the ACS eligibility requirements suggests at least three potential 
comparison groups for ACS recipients. Specifically, one can compare ACS qualifiers to (1) 
students satisfying the GPA requirement but who failed to meet the credit hours requirement, (2) 
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students satisfying the credit hours requirement but who did not meet the GPA requirement, and 
(3) students who did not meet either requirement.60 
These potential comparison groups are displayed in Figure 1, which graphs individual 
credit hours earned in the spring semester of 201061—the last semester before the expansion of 
the ACS—and cumulative GPA at the end of the spring semester for in-state enrollees who had 
completed a FAFSA and were continuously enrolled at LAU since their initial matriculation. 
There are three types of LAU students presented in Figure 1: individuals who did not receive the 
ACS (blue crosses), individuals who received the ACS (red circles), and individuals who had 
received an earlier version of the ACS at any point in their college career (small black circles). 
While our analysis could potentially examine each of the three comparisons outlined above, we 
instead focus on comparison (2): students satisfying the credit hours requirement who failed to 
meet the GPA requirement. This comparison is highlighted with a black box in Figure 1. We 
have chosen this comparison because, while credit hours may appear to be a continuous variable, 
it is at best an ordinal variable when we restrict our analysis to a small band around the credit 
hour cutoff. This violates the continuity requirement of assignment variables in an RDD (Imbens 
& Leimux, 2008). Thus, our estimates of the effects of the ACS on college outcomes will be 
                                                 
60 As Reardon and Robinson (2012) note, one can accomplish the final comparison by combining 
the two continuous assignment variables into a single continuous variable using a Euclidean 
distance transformation. For the purposes of our analysis, we could use the variable  
𝑑𝑖 = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑐𝐺𝑃𝐴𝑖)√𝑐𝐺𝑃𝐴𝑖
2 + 𝑐𝐻𝑟𝑠𝑖
2, where cGPA is the ACS GPA requirement centered at the 
cutoff score of 2.5 and cHrs is the credit hour requirement centered at 12 hours. 
61 The ACS required Current Achievers to be continuously enrolled full-time (12 hours) in every 
semester prior to the fall of 2010. The sample presented in Figure 1 has first been restricted to 
only those individuals who have met the continual enrollment requirement in every semester 
before the spring of 2010. This allows us to effectively turn the continual enrollment requirement 




driven by a comparison of individuals meeting the ACS credit hours requirements with 
cumulative GPAs within a small range around 2.5 points.62 
 
Figure 1. Dual eligibility requirements for the ACS. Current Achievers qualifying for the ACS 
had to have at least 12 credit hours and a cumulative GPA of 2.5 in the semester prior to the 
introduction of the ACS. This figure highlights the dual nature of the ACS eligibility 
requirements. The black box depicts the comparison under study in this analysis: individuals near 
the pre-ACS GPA threshold who have satisfied the credit hours requirement. 
Before moving on, there are several important points to make about Figure 1. First, while 
they constitute a small portion of the data, prior ACS recipients (small black circles) are clearly 
represented in the sample presented in Figure 1. As we describe later, our analytical models 
control for these individuals using a dummy variable indicating if an individual ever received an 
ACS prior to the 2010-11 expansion. Second, there are a small number of individuals who 
received the ACS scholarship in the fall of 2010 who appear to have only met one of the two 
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eligibility requirements. While our fuzzy regression discontinuity will partially account for these 
individuals in the first stage of our instrumental variables model, it is important to note that these 
individuals highlight potential issues with our current assignment variables.63 As such, we would 
like to stress that the findings presented here are preliminary and should be taken with caution. 
The fuzzy regression discontinuity model. Our analytical strategy is to leverage our 
knowledge of the ASC eligibility criteria to examine the effects of the program on Current 
Achievers via a regression discontinuity design. This technique has been commonly used in 
papers examining the effects of financial aid on college enrollment (Kane, 2003; Scott-Clayton, 
2012; van der Klaauw, 2002) and outcomes (Scott-Clayton, 2012). Nevertheless, while ACS 
eligibility is determined by well-defined cutoffs, it is not generally true that ACS receipt is solely 
a function of one’s qualification status. Specifically, although students may meet each of the 
eligibility requirements outlined above, it is not guaranteed that all qualifying students will 
actually apply for the program. As such, we identify the impact of the ACS on students using a 
fuzzy regression discontinuity design in which we predict ACS receipt using one’s qualification 
status. 
Specifically, we employ the following two-stage least squares (2SLS) model to estimate 
the effects of ACS using predicted—rather than observed—ACS receipt as our independent 
variable of interest: 
                                                 
63 Only five individuals who do not meet both qualifications but nevertheless received an ACS 
scholarship make it in to our final analytical sample. We have tested the extent to which these 
observations influence the results presented in Tables 4 through 6—our primary ACS effect 
estimates—by re-running the models while excluding these observations. In all cases, the 
estimated coefficients are in the same direction, but in a small number of cases, removal of these 
observations nudges the coefficients estimates over the statistically significant threshold. In 
general, however, the estimates are not substantially different and we therefore conclude that 
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2. 𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑅?̂? + 𝑓(𝑐𝐺𝑃𝐴𝑖)
′𝛿1 + 𝑓(𝑐𝐺𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑥𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑦𝑖)
′𝛿2 + 𝑋𝑖′𝛾 + 𝜖𝑖 
where 𝑅𝑖indicates observed ACS receipt, Qualifyi indicates if an individual qualifies for ACS, 
𝑓(. ) is a second-order polynomial function of the centered pre-ACS GPA assignment variable 
(cGPA), and 𝑋 is a vector of demographic control variables capturing student gender, ethnicity, 
and financial resources. As was described in the previous section, all models first condition on 
having met the ACS credit hours requirement of 12 hours. If one’s qualification status 
successfully predicts the probability that they take up a scholarship and our model sufficiently 
captures the underlying relationship between the assignment variable and our outcomes of 
interest and qualification status, then the parameter estimate on 𝑅?̂? represents the causal effect of 
receiving an ACS for those individuals near the assignment variable’s threshold. 
Outcome variables of interest. We are interested in estimating the impact of receiving the 
ACS on both short- and long-term college outcomes. In particular, we are interested in two broad 
categories of outcomes: measures collected after one year of program participation and measures 
collected at the end-of-college. We briefly describe the seven measures we use to capture these 
outcomes here. 
 GPA after 1 year. Our first outcome measure is a student’s cumulative GPA at the end of 
the spring semester of 2011. While we refer to this variable as “GPA after 1 year”, it actually 
reflects one’s GPA after two semesters of program participation. Following Scott-Clayton 
(2012), we impute for missing values of GPA in this semester using previously observed 
cumulative GPA values for the student. 
 Likelihood of persisting 1 year. We identify a student as having persisted 1 year in 




we estimate the effects of ACS on student persistence using instrumental variables in a probit 
specification. 
 Credit hours accumulated after 1 year. We calculated credit hours accumulated as the 
difference between one’s credit hours earned at the end of the 2011 spring semester and their 
credit hours accumulated at the end of the 2010 spring semester. As with GPA, we impute for 
missing credit hour values using credit hours accumulated in earlier semesters. 
 Credit hours accumulated after 2 years. As an intermediary step between our year 1 
outcomes and our end-of-college outcomes, we examine the effects of the ACS on student credit 
hour accumulation after two years of ACS availability. This variable is calculated as the 
difference between one’s credit hours accumulated at the end of the 2012 spring semester and 
their hours accumulated in the spring of 2010. Students entering college in the fall semester of 
2007—the oldest cohort in our data—are expected to be starting their fourth year of college in 
the fall of 2010. Analyses examining the effects of the ACS on credit hour accumulation after 
two years will exclude these students because there is no expectation that they will still be 
enrolled at LAU two years after the fall of 2010. 
 Final GPA. In addition to examining one’s GPA after one year of ACS availability, we 
estimate the impact of ACS receipt on a student’s last-observed GPA. As with the short-run GPA 
measure, we impute for missing values of GPA using earlier observed values (Scott-Clayton, 
2012). 
 Likelihood of graduating within 4 and 5 years. Our final two outcome measures 
estimate the impact of ACS receipt on graduating within four and five years. These are binary 




their 9th or 11th semester64, respectively. As with persistence, we estimate the effects of ACS 
receipt on these measures using instrumental variables with a probit specification to account for 
the variables’ binary nature. 
Figure 2 provides a first look at how ACS qualification is related to our outcome 
variables of interest. Specifically, Figure 2 presents graphs of simple regressions of the seven 
outcome measures against cumulative GPA in the spring of 2010 (hereafter pre-ACS GPA), 
which has been centered at the ACS cutoff of 2.5 GPA points. All models condition on meeting 
the ACS credit hours requirement and control for the underlying relationship between outcomes 
and pre-ACS GPA using a quadratic specification—the same specification that we employ in our 
primary analytical models. In addition, the graphs are restricted to a pre-ACS GPAs ranging 
between 2.2 and 2.8 points (or a band of 0.30 GPA points). Because ACS qualification does not 
perfectly predict receipt, these graphs represent intent-to-treat estimates.65 
The results presented in Figure 2 provide some evidence suggesting negative impacts on 
persistence, credit hour accumulation, and the likelihood that one graduates within 4 and 5 years. 
On the other hand, the graphs for both GPA measures do not reflect strong ACS impacts. Finally, 
it is important to note that the data presented in these graphs are quite noisy—especially for the 
binary outcomes of interest. While our more sophisticated regression models will help to address 
some of this noise using control variables, we nevertheless want to again highlight the need for 
applying caution when interpreting our results. 
                                                 
64 Analyses focusing on the probability of graduating within 5 years exclude students in the 
2009-10 cohort because we cannot observe this outcome for these students as our data end in 
2013-14. 
65 The difference between receipt and qualification suggests that one can get a good 
approximation of the treatment-on-treated impact estimates by dividing the intent-to-treat 











Figure 2. Outcome variables by centered pre-ACS GPA assignment variable, conditional on meeting the ACS hours requirement. 
All graphs employ a quadratic specification for the assignment variable and are restricted to our primary analytical range of 2.20 
to 2.50 pre-ACS GPA points. 




Density of pre-ACS GPA assignment variable. As a last check of our regression 
discontinuity specification, we examine in Figure 3 the distribution of our pre-ACS GPA 
assignment variable in the 2007-08, 2008-09, and 2009-10 LAU cohorts. Specifically, Figure 3 
presents the density of individuals within .05 GPA point bins to the left and right of the 2.5 point 
cutoff. Ideally, one would examine a relatively smooth density to the left and right of the cutoff; 
as a discontinuous density is suggestive of gaming of the assignment variable (Imbens & 
Lemieux, 2008; Scott-Clayton, 2012). Unfortunately, the results presented in Figure 3 indicate a 
relatively large increase in the grouping of individuals scoring at or slightly above a 2.5 in the 
spring of 2010. This is largely accounted for by nine students with cumulative GPAs exactly 
equaling 2.5 (seven in the 2009-10 cohort and 2 in the 2008-09 cohort). This discontinuous jump 
in pre-ACS GPA to the right of the performance threshold may indicate that students worked 
harder in the spring of 2010 to increase their GPAs in order to meet the ACS requirements. 
Nevertheless, while such gaming would be problematic for our analysis, we believe this is 
unlikely to be a problem as the ACS eligibility requirements were officially passed in April, 
2010, leaving little opportunity for students to strategically manipulate their GPAs (Arkansas 
Department of Higher Education, 2010). In short, the discontinuity observed in Figure 3 likely 





Figure 3. Graph of density by Centered pre-ACS GPA assignment variable with kernel density 
overlay. Bins represent .05 GPA point gaps. All individuals have met the ACS hours threshold. 
Source. Authors’ calculations. 
 
Sample 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for three groups of students for a number of 
demographic characteristics. The first three columns of Table 2 present data for our primary 
analytical sample: students entering LAU in the 2007-08, 2008-09, and 2009-10 school years 
that had applied from within the state of Arkansas, had submitted a FAFSA application, met the 
ACS credit hours requirement, and had pre-ACS GPAs ranging between 2.2 and 2.8 GPA points. 
The next three columns (“Relaxed GPA and Hours Requirements”) represent all in-state 
applicants in the 2007-08 through 2009-10 cohort years who submitted a FAFSA application. 
The final three columns (“Relaxed Residency Requirement”) present descriptive data for all 
applicants who submitted a FAFSA, independent of their original state of residence. 
In general, the students included in our analytical sample are slightly more likely to be 













Relaxed GPA and Hours 
Requirements   
Relaxed Residency 
Requirement 
  N Mean SD   N Mean SD   N Mean SD 
Male 321 0.53 0.50  3430 0.50 0.50  5310 0.49 0.50 
Ethnicity            
    Black 321 0.13 0.33  3430 0.09 0.28  5310 0.08 0.27 
    Hispanic 321 0.06 0.23  3430 0.04 0.20  5310 0.04 0.20 
    White 321 0.76 0.43  3430 0.80 0.40  5310 0.80 0.40 
    Other 321 0.24 0.43  3430 0.20 0.40  5310 0.20 0.40 
Parent went to college 321 0.53 0.50  3425 0.57 0.49  5303 0.63 0.48 
High School GPA 321 3.38 0.33  3429 3.56 0.42  5308 3.58 0.42 
ACT Composite 320 23.65 3.14  3419 25.50 3.91  5290 25.59 3.85 
Expected Family Contribution Percentile            
    0-24 321 0.30 0.46  3430 0.27 0.44  5310 0.25 0.43 
    25-49 321 0.33 0.47  3430 0.30 0.46  5310 0.25 0.43 
    50-74 321 0.17 0.38  3430 0.19 0.40  5310 0.25 0.43 
    75-100 321 0.20 0.40  3430 0.24 0.43  5310 0.25 0.43 
Cohort Year            
    2007-08 321 0.17 0.37  3430 0.31 0.46  5310 0.31 0.46 
    2008-09 321 0.32 0.47  3430 0.34 0.48  5310 0.35 0.48 
    2009-10 321 0.51 0.50   3430 0.34 0.48   5310 0.35 0.48 
Note. Individuals included in the analytical sample have submitted a FAFSA, applied to LAU from within Arkansas, met the ACS credit hours requirement of 12 
hours, and had a pre-ACS cumulative GPA between 2.20 and 2.80 GPA points. 








academic credentials on average. In addition, students in our analytical sample tend to have 
lower expected family contribution (EFC) values—a variable indicating the expected amount of 
school tuition a family’s income can support—than students in the other groups. Finally, it is 
important to note that younger individuals (those from the 2009-10 cohort) compose a relatively 
larger portion of the sample. This is not particularly surprising, as more students in the older 
cohort have had more opportunities to leave LAU and more opportunities to fail to qualify due to 
the continual enrollment requirement. Nevertheless, it is important to note that this younger 
cohort composes a larger portion of our sample.66 
Results 
In this section, we present the preliminary estimates of the effects of the Academic 
Challenge Scholarship on college outcomes for students near the program’s GPA eligibility 
requirements. In general, our results suggest the scholarship had limited impacts on Current 
Achiever GPA after one year, persistence likelihood, and credit accumulation after both one and 
two years. On the other hand, ACS recipients appear to have a significantly lower final GPA and 
likelihood of graduating within four years relative to non-recipients. Nevertheless, ACS 
recipients appear to catch up to non-recipients over time, as our models indicate insignificant 
differences in the probability of graduating within five years. In the following sections, we 
present the results from our preliminary analyses along with several specification tests examining 
the robustness of our results. 
Primary RDD Analysis 
As discussed above, we estimate the effects of the ACS on college outcomes using a 
fuzzy regression discontinuity design. In particular, we are using one’s qualification status to 
                                                 
66 We include a moderator analysis examining if ACS effects are differentially experienced 








first predict ACS receipt in a two-stage least squares (2SLS) framework; and then using this 
predicted likelihood of receipt to estimate the impact of the scholarship on student outcomes. 
Before moving on to our primary results, we present in Table 3 the results for first stage 
regressions using ACS qualification to predict scholarship receipt. Columns 1-4 present results 
for our preferred pre-ACS GPA band of .30 GPA points67 (or GPAs ranging between 2.2 and 2.8 
points), with model specifications increasing in complexity as one moves from left to right in 
Table 3. Columns 5 and 6 present results from fully specified models employing larger and 
smaller pre-ACS GPA bands which are used to check the stability of our results in a following 
section. 
In general, the results presented in Table 3 suggest that ACS qualification is a relevant 
predictor of ACS receipt, with take-up probabilities ranging between 30 and 40 percentage 
points. In addition, we note that the first stage joint F-statistics are greater than 10 in models 
presented in columns 1 through 5, satisfying Staiger and Stock’s (1997) recommended threshold 
for instrumental variable relevance. The final model, which relies on a smaller pre-ACS GPA 
band (.20)—and therefore a smaller sample—does not meet this threshold. We therefore again 
recommend caution when interpreting these results. 
  
                                                 
67 After visually inspecting the data, we chose .30 as our pre-ACS GPA bandwidth because it 
provided a sufficiently large sample with which to estimate effects while also allowing for us to 










First Stage Regression Results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Qualify for ACS 
0.32** 0.40*** 0.31** 0.38*** 0.36*** 0.40*** 
(0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.05) (0.09) 
Controls       
   Student demographics  X  X X X 
   Family income    X X X X 
Observations 322 321 322 321 451 205 
Joint F-Statistic 15.86 16.31 12.21 12.64 20.71 7.50 
R-squared 0.24 0.29 0.26 0.30 0.29 0.25 
ACS GPA Band 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.40 0.20 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering of individuals in major. All models include controls for 
entering cohort year, pre-ACS hours below 15 hours, and quadratic functions of the assignment variable, centered 
pre-ACS GPA. 
Source. Authors’ calculations. 
 
The models presented in Table 4 examine the effects of ACS receipt on student 
cumulative GPA and likelihood of persisting one year after ACS receipt. The parameter 
estimates for the persistence models (columns 5 through 8) represent marginal probabilities 
estimated at mean values for the included covariates. In general, the results presented in Table 4 
suggest that ACS receipt has statistically insignificant, yet positive, effects on Current Achievers 
after one year. Specifically, our preferred models—which include demographic and financial 
background control variables—suggest that ACS recipients scored on average .13 GPA points 
higher than their counterparts after one year and were 5 percentage points more likely to be 
enrolled at LAU after one year. Nevertheless, the relatively large standard errors presented in 
Table 4 indicate that we cannot state with confidence that the true effect estimate differs from 
zero. 
Table 5 presents results for models estimating the ACS effects on credit hour 
accumulation after one (columns 1-4) and two years (columns 5-8). The latter analyses are 










RD Estimated ACS Effects on GPA and Likelihood of Persisting One Year After Receipt 
  Outcome: Year 1 GPA   Outcome: Pr(Persist 1 Year) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Predicted ACS Receipt 
0.12 0.15 0.11 0.13  0.00 0.07 -0.02 0.05 
(0.12) (0.13) (0.10) (0.11)  (0.22) (0.19) (0.25) (0.20) 
Male 
 -0.04**  -0.04**   -0.01  -0.01 
 (0.02)  (0.01)   (0.03)  (0.04) 
Black 
 -0.03  -0.01   -0.59**  -0.53*** 
 (0.06)  (0.07)   (0.25)  (0.19) 
Hispanic 
 0.07  0.09   -0.61***  -0.55*** 
 (0.11)  (0.11)   (0.23)  (0.16) 
Other race 
 -0.09  -0.10   0.58**  0.53*** 
 (0.06)  (0.07)   (0.23)  (0.17) 
Parent attended college 
 0.00  0.01   0.04  0.03 
 (0.04)  (0.04)   (0.02)  (0.03) 
EFC Percentile 
  : 25-49 
  -0.11*** -0.10***    -0.03 -0.02 
  (0.03) (0.02)    (0.03) (0.02) 
EFC Percentile  
  : 50-74 
  -0.09* -0.11***    0.03 0.01 
  (0.05) (0.03)    (0.06) (0.05) 
EFC Percentile 
  : 75-100 
  0.01 -0.01    0.01 -0.01 
  (0.04) (0.05)    (0.03) (0.02) 
Prior ACS recipient 
  0.01 0.02    0.04 0.02 
  (0.03) (0.03)    (0.04) (0.03) 
N 322 321 322 321  322 321 322 321 
ACS GPA Band .30 .30 .30 .30   0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering of individuals in major. All models include controls for entering cohort year, pre-ACS hours below 15 
hours, and quadratic functions of the assignment variable, centered pre-ACS GPA. See Table A1 for remaining coefficient estimates. 











RD Estimated ACS Effects on Credit Hour Accumulation After Receipt 
  Outcome: 1 Year Credit Accumulation   Outcome: 2 Year Credit Accumulation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Predicted ACS Receipt 
-6.42 -3.59 -7.47 -4.72  -8.39 -6.35 -10.16 -8.38 
(13.86) (11.50) (15.56) (13.69)  (13.09) (12.30) (15.60) (15.61) 
Male 
 -0.93  -0.99   -0.90  -1.02 
 (1.04)  (1.30)   (0.92)  (1.28) 
Black 
 1.20  1.74   3.75  4.61 
 (3.74)  (4.52)   (4.57)  (5.90) 
Hispanic 
 -0.74  -0.32   2.14  3.06 
 (2.60)  (3.19)   (4.35)  (5.80) 
Other race 
 -1.21  -1.34   -3.63  -4.29 
 (3.04)  (3.46)   (3.85)  (4.81) 
Parent attended college 
 1.43  1.41   1.48  1.90 
 (1.20)  (1.11)   (1.62)  (1.81) 
EFC Percentile 
  : 25-49 
  -1.61 -1.68*    1.41 0.72 
  (1.26) (0.98)    (1.73) (1.62) 
EFC Percentile  
  : 50-74 
  0.96 -0.23    0.97 -0.38 
  (3.64) (3.03)    (3.50) (3.17) 
EFC Percentile  
  : 75-100 
  1.33 0.59    -0.89 -0.87 
  (2.35) (2.01)    (1.66) (1.34) 
Prior ACS recipient 
  1.49 1.03    2.00 1.94 
  (2.09) (1.96)    (2.05) (2.45) 
N 322 321 322 321  251 251 251 251 
ACS GPA Band 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30   .30 .30 .30 .30 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering of individuals in major. All models include controls for entering cohort year, pre-ACS hours below 15 
hours, and quadratic functions of the assignment variable, centered pre-ACS GPA. See Table A1 for remaining coefficient estimates. 





their fourth year when they could receive the expanded ACS and are therefore less likely to 
persist for two years. In contrast to the results presented in Table 4, the credit accumulation 
models suggest that ACS recipients earned fewer credit hours—roughly five fewer hours over a 
two semester period and nine fewer hours over a four semester period. Nevertheless, as before, 
all effect estimates are not statistically significant. 
Finally, Table 6 presents ACS effect estimates for three end-of-college outcomes: final 
GPA, likelihood of graduating within four years, and likelihood of graduating within five years. 
While the results in Tables 4 and 5 are all statistically insignificant, ACS recipients appear to 
score about a quarter of a GPA point lower than non-recipients at the end of their college career 
and are significantly less likely to graduate within four years. While the latter estimates are 
particularly large—suggesting ACS recipients are 50 percentage points less likely to graduate 
within four years—they do align with the simple graphical analysis presented in Figure 2. On the 
other hand, ACS recipients appear to catch up to their counterparts by their fifth year in college, 
as the effect estimates presented in columns 9 through 12 are statistically insignificant. It is 
important to note, however, that the 2009-10 cohort cannot contribute to the latter findings due to 
data limitations. We explore the extent to which the 2009-10 cohort is driving the other observed 
findings in the following section. 
In summary, the results presented in Tables 4 through 6 suggest that Current Achievers 
receiving the ACS do not look significantly different than their counterparts after one year, but 
have significantly lower final GPAs and likelihood of graduating within four years. At the same 
time, ACS recipients are no less likely to graduate within five years. In the following section, we 










RD Estimated ACS Effects on End-of-College Outcomes 
  Outcome: Final GPA   Outcome: Pr(Grad. in 4 years)   Outcome: Pr(Grad. in 5 years) 














0.53***  0.17 0.27 -0.08 0.08 
(0.15) (0.10) (0.18) (0.13)  (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07)  
(0.34
) (0.23) (0.33) (0.30) 
Male  -0.04  -0.03   -0.01  -0.01   
0.12*
*  0.12* 
 (0.02)  (0.03)   (0.04)  (0.05)   (0.06)  (0.07) 
Black 
 0.02  0.03   0.12*  0.13   -0.23  -0.21 
 (0.09)  (0.11)   (0.07)  (0.09)   (0.14)  (0.23) 
Hispanic 
 0.17  0.19   -0.08  -0.05   -0.35  -0.39 
 (0.14)  (0.16)   (0.15)  (0.15)   (0.26)  (0.28) 
Other race 
 -0.17*  -0.18*   -0.07*  -0.07   0.17  0.18 
 (0.09)  (0.10)   (0.04)  (0.05)   (0.13)  (0.19) 
Parent att. 
college 
 0.08  0.09*   0.08*  0.06   -0.04  -0.02 
 (0.05)  (0.05)   (0.04)  (0.05)   (0.07)  (0.07) 
EFC Percentile 





0.05**    -0.04 -0.04    -0.07 
-
0.11* 
  (0.03) (0.02)    (0.07) (0.07)    (0.09) (0.06) 
EFC Percentile 
  : 50-74 
  0.01 -0.05    0.11* 0.08    0.14 0.05 
  (0.09) (0.08)    (0.07) (0.09)    (0.15) (0.18) 
EFC Percentile 
  : 75-100 
  0.09 0.06    0.09 0.07    0.03 -0.02 
  (0.06) (0.05)    (0.06) (0.06)    (0.11) (0.07) 
Prior ACS 
recipient 
  0.04 0.04    0.07*** 0.05    
0.18*
* 0.14 
  (0.04) (0.05)    (0.02) (0.03)    (0.08) (0.08) 
N 322 321 322 321  322 321 322 321  159 158 159 158 
ACS GPA 








*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering of individuals in major. All models include controls for entering cohort year, pre-ACS hours below 15 
hours, and quadratic functions of the assignment variable, centered pre-ACS GPA. See Table A2 for remaining coefficient estimates. 
Source. Authors’ calculations.





In this section, we present several checks of our results. We begin by expanding our 
analytical sample by relaxing some of the requirements for ACS qualification in order to increase 
the statistical power of our analysis. Next, we examine the extent to which our results are 
sensitive to varying pre-ACS GPA bandwidths. Two following analyses examine the extent to 
which model misspecification may be driving our primary results. Finally, we provide a 
robustness check in which we attempt to estimate ACS effects using earlier LAU cohorts for 
whom the Arkansas scholarship lottery financed expansion of the ACS was unavailable. It would 
be problematic for our analysis if we find that ACS receipt positively predicts college outcomes 
in a sample of students who could not receive the scholarship. In general, the results presented in 
this section do not harm the credibility of our primary findings. 
Including non-FAFSA filers to increase power. As mentioned earlier, the large 
standard errors present in Tables 4 through 6 indicate substantial noise in our models. This is 
partially a function of our analytical strategy: by focusing on a subset of LAU students within a 
small pre-ACS GPA range, we are significantly limiting the power of our study. In addition, it 
may be the case that college outcomes measures are relatively noisy for students with low 
academic credentials. Given these issues, it would be reasonable to assume that the null findings 
largely presented in Tables 4 through 6 are the result of low statistical power rather than a true 
equivalence of outcomes. 
Fortunately, we can increase our model power by relaxing some of the requirements for 
inclusion in our analytical sample. For example, the analytical sample has until now excluded 
non-FAFSA filers in order to strictly adhere to the ACS qualifications for Current Achievers. 
Instead, we can expand the analytical sample—while not strongly adjusting the primary 




estimates—by including in-state students who did not complete a FAFSA using the following 
model: 
3. 𝑅𝑖 = 𝑎 + ℎ𝐹𝑖 + 𝑏𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑦𝑖 + 𝑓(𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑐𝐺𝑃𝐴𝑖)′𝑐 + 𝑓(𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑐𝐺𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑥𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑦𝑖)
′𝑑 + 𝑋𝑖′𝑔 + 𝑒𝑖 
4. 𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝜏𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑅?̂? + 𝑓(𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑐𝐺𝑃𝐴𝑖)
′𝛿1 + 𝑓(𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑐𝐺𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑥𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑦𝑖)
′𝛿2 + 𝑋𝑖′𝛾 + 𝜖𝑖 
where equation (3) represents a first stage regression for the model outlined in equation (4) and F 
indicates if an individual has completed a FAFSA. The models presented in equations (3) and (4) 
differ from our primary models only in that they include the FAFSA indicator along with its 
interaction with the treatment and assignment variables of interest to our RDD. The coefficient 
on FAFSA gives the difference between FAFSA non-recipients and FAFSA non-filers. The 
coefficient on the interaction expresses the difference of interest: the estimated difference 
between qualified ACS applicants who are predicted to receive an ACS scholarship and eligible 
applicants who are not predicted to receive the scholarship. Given the model specification, we 
should expect the estimates to strongly mirror those presented in Tables 4 through 6 while the 
overall precision of the model will be improved. 
Tables 7a and 7b present analyses based on the model outlined in equations 3 and 4. Two 
models are presented for each outcome: a simple model and a model that includes demographic 
controls.68 As expected, the estimated coefficients on the interactions largely mirror those 
presented in Tables 4 through 6. Furthermore, the estimated relationships for the baseline 
characteristics are similar. Interestingly, despite the increase in model precision—as noted by the  
                                                 
68 Our data limits us to only knowing family income via the FAFSA application. We cannot 
include controls for family income because they are perfectly collinear with FAFSA. Thus, while 
the model precision is improved in tables 7a and 7b, we caution the reader to take the results 
presented in tables 4 through 6 as our primary results. 









RD Effect Estimates for Short- and Medium-run Outcomes, including Non-FAFSA Filers 
  Year 1 GPA   Pr(Persist 1 Year)   Year 1 Credit Acc.   Year 2 Credit Acc. 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8) 
FAFSA & ACS 
Interaction 
0.13 0.15  0.04 0.09  -7.12 -4.65  -10.68 -9.12 
(0.11) (0.11)  (0.28) (0.26)  (13.96) (12.19)  (13.06) (13.26) 
FAFSA Filer 
-0.11** -0.10**  -0.02 -0.03  -0.39 -0.60  2.38 2.49 
(0.04) (0.04)  (0.07) (0.07)  (3.77) (3.55)  (2.96) (3.39) 
Male 
 -0.04***   0.00   -0.71   -0.44 
 (0.01)   (0.04)   (0.72)   (0.71) 
Black 
 -0.06   -0.65***   1.35   3.94 
 (0.06)   (0.23)   (3.75)   (4.43) 
Hispanic 
 0.06   -0.67***   -0.56   2.37 
 (0.11)   (0.19)   (2.21)   (4.30) 
Other race 
 -0.06   0.63***   -1.36   -3.45 
 (0.06)   (0.20)   (2.82)   (3.69) 
Parent attended college 
 -0.00   0.00   1.05   1.37 
 (0.04)   (0.03)   (0.95)   (1.28) 
N 489 488  489 488  480 479  373 373 
ACS GPA Band .30 .30   .30 .30   .30 .30   .30 .30 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering of individuals in major. All models include controls for entering cohort year, pre-ACS hours below 15 
hours, and quadratic functions of the assignment variable, centered pre-ACS GPA. 
Source. Authors’ calculations. 
  









RD Effect Estimates for Short- and Medium-run Outcomes, including Non-FAFSA Filers 
  Final GPA   Pr(Graduate in 4 Years)   Pr(Graduate in 5 Years) 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
FAFSA & ACS Interaction 
-0.33** -0.26***  -0.66*** -0.62***  0.17 0.24 
(0.14) (0.09)  (0.07) (0.07)  (0.41) (0.27) 
FAFSA Filer 
-0.01 0.02  0.11*** 0.11***  -0.11 -0.10 
(0.03) (0.03)  (0.03) (0.04)  (0.17) (0.14) 
Male 
 -0.04**   -0.03   0.10* 
 (0.02)   (0.05)   (0.05) 
Black 
 -0.02   0.17***   -0.24** 
 (0.08)   (0.06)   (0.11) 
Hispanic 
 0.15   -0.06   -0.31 
 (0.12)   (0.13)   (0.21) 
Other race 
 -0.13   -0.13***   0.19 
 (0.09)   (0.03)   (0.13) 
Parent attended college 
 0.07*   0.07   -0.03 
 (0.04)   (0.05)   (0.08) 
N 484 483  489 488  240 239 
ACS GPA Band .30 .30  .30 .30  .30 .30 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering of individuals in major. All models include controls for entering cohort year, pre-ACS hours below 15 
hours, and quadratic functions of the assignment variable, centered pre-ACS GPA. 





smaller observed standard errors in Tables 7a and 7b—the general relationships remain: ACS 
receipt is associated with insignificant differences in the short-run; but significant negative 
relationships between final GPA and likelihood of graduation. Nevertheless, the differences 
again dissipate after 5 years. 
Thus, despite the increased statistical power of the analyses presented in Table 7a and 7b, 
the general story remains the same: ACS receipt is associated with insignificant differences on 
short-run outcomes, negative results for final GPA and likelihood of graduating within four 
years, and yet an insignificant difference in the likelihood of graduating within five years. 
Varying band widths. Table 8 presents results from models examining the relationship 
between ACS receipt and our seven college outcomes using varying pre-ACS GPA bandwidths. 
All models are fully specified, employing demographic and financial history controls. Columns 
1, 4, and 7 reproduce the results for our analyses using our preferred 0.30 bandwidth. Columns 2, 
5, and 8 present results for a larger bandwidth of 0.40 (GPA ranging from 2.1 to 2.9 points). 
Columns 3, 6, and 9 present results for a smaller bandwidth of 0.20 (GPA ranging from 2.3 to 
2.7 points). Unfortunately, we were unable to achieve convergence for our probit models 
estimating ACS effects for year 1 persistence for pre-ACS GPA bands of .40 and .20. Instead, we 
present results from Linear Probability Models (LPM), which effectively treat the dichotomous 
persistence variable as a continuous variable.69 While LPM estimation is not the preferred 
method70, it is the best means available to estimate these relationships.  
                                                 
69 This assumption leads both to heteroskedasticity in the model (Angrist & Pischke, 2009) and 
bias in estimated effects (Wooldridge, 2002). 
70 Roughly 17 percent of observations in the .40 GPA band LPM estimate have predicted 
probabilities falling outside the plausible range of 0 and 1. The corresponding percentage in the 










RD Effect Estimated with Varying Band Widths 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 
  Year 1 GPA   Pr(Persist 1 Year)ǂ         
Predicted ACS 
Receipt 
0.13 0.08 0.00  0.05 0.05 -0.15     
(0.11) (0.18) (0.17)  (0.20) (0.28) (0.35)     
            
N 321 451 205  321 451 205     
ACS GPA Band 0.30 0.40 0.20   0.30 0.40 0.20         
            
  Year 1 Credit Acc.   Year 2 Credit Acc.         
Predicted ACS 
Receipt 
-4.72 -7.04 -7.74  -8.38 -10.15 -11.23     
(13.69) (11.48) (15.38)  (15.61) (12.36) (14.28)     
            
N 321 451 205  251 358 160     
ACS GPA Band 0.30 0.40 0.20   .30 .40 .20         
            
  Final GPA   Pr(Graduate in 4 years)   Pr(Graduate in 5 years) 
Predicted ACS 
Receipt 
-0.26* -0.25* -0.38  -0.53*** -0.48*** -0.53***  0.08 -0.05 -.01 
-0.13 -0.13 -0.24  (0.07) (0.08) (0.05)  (0.30) (0.23) (0.41) 
            
N 241 345 146  321 451 205  158 221 101 
ACS GPA Band 0.30 0.40 0.20   0.30 0.40 0.20   0.30 0.40 0.20 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
ǂ Effects on persistence are estimated using linear probability models for .40 and .20 ACS GPA Bands due to a failure to achieve convergence in probit models. 
Note. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering of individuals in major. All models are fully specified: they include controls for student demographics, 
family finance, entering cohort year, pre-ACS hours below 15 hours, and quadratic functions of the assignment variable, centered pre-ACS GPA. 
Source. Authors’ calculations. 




In general, the effect estimates presented in Table 8 are not particularly sensitive to band 
width: ACS receipt is insignificantly related to year 1 GPA, credit hour accumulation, and the 
likelihood of graduating within five years. Similarly, ACS is strongly and negatively related to 
both final GPA and the likelihood of gradating in four years. In addition, the coefficient 
estimates are fairly similar across models in Table 8. The consistency of these findings is 
promising for our analysis. 
Differential effects among prior ACS recipients. Currently, prior ACS recipients—or 
students who received an ACS in at least one semester after initial matriculation prior to the 
expansion of the program in the fall of 2010—constitute nearly 40 percent of our analytical 
sample. The models presented in Tables 4 through 6 account for differences in college outcomes 
experienced among this group using a simple dummy variable; effectively assuming that the 
ACS expansion treatment effects on college outcomes are experienced similarly among old and 
new ACS recipients.71 If, instead, prior ACS recipients differ from new ACS recipients, our 
primary results could suffer from bias due to misspecification. For example, the insignificant 
results observed in Tables 4 through 6 could be explained by prior ACS recipients having 
already experienced the benefits of the program, thereby effectively masking any positive results 
experienced by new recipients. It is important to examine the extent to which prior ACS 
recipients are driving our overall estimates because they constitute such a large portion of the 
analytical sample. 
                                                 
71 At the same time, the qualification and receipt rates are actually fairly similar between the two 
groups. Specifically, 74 percent of students who did not receive an ACS in the past qualified in 
the fall of 2010 compared to 66 percent of prior ACS recipients. Of these, 51 percent of students 
who did not receive the ACS in the past received the scholarship in the fall of 2010 compared to 
61 percent of prior ACS recipients. 









Comparing Prior ACS Recipients with New ACS Recipients 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8) 
  Year 1 GPA   Pr(Persist 1 Yr.) ǂ   Year 1 Credit Acc.   Year 2 Credit Acc. 
Predicted ACS Receipt 0.12 0.13  0.02 0.07  -6.80 -4.75  -8.97 -7.08 
 (0.11) (0.10)  (0.37) (0.31)  (14.38) (13.67)  (12.34) (12.50) 
ACS Receipt & Prior ACS Interaction 0.05 0.01  -0.10 -0.10  1.04 0.62  7.23* 6.49* 
(0.11) (0.13)  (0.09) (0.08)  (2.37) (1.82)  (4.39) (3.70) 
Prior ACS Recipient -0.02 0.01  0.06* 0.07***  0.02 0.76  -2.26 -1.43 
 (0.04) (0.05)  (0.04) (0.02)  (0.98) (1.79)  (1.56) (2.28) 
Controls for demographics and income  X   X   X   X 
N 322 321   322 321   322 321   251 251 
            
  Final GPA   Pr(Grad. in 4 Yrs.) ǂ   Pr(Grad. in 5 Yrs.) ǂ       
Predicted ACS Receipt -0.32** -0.26**  -1.11*** -0.93***  0.02 -0.14    
 (0.15) (0.13)  (0.38) (0.29)  (0.49) (0.48)    
ACS Receipt & Prior ACS Interaction 0.14 0.06  0.29** 0.30  0.99*** 0.97***    
(0.21) (0.23)  (0.15) (0.25)  (0.33) (0.31)    
Prior ACS Recipient -0.06 0.02  -0.11 -0.04  -0.31*** -0.21***    
 (0.07) (0.11)  (0.08) (0.11)  (0.07) (0.07)    
Controls for demographics and income  X   X   X    
N 322 321   322 321   159 158       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
ǂ Effects on persistence are estimated using linear probability models for .40 and .20 ACS GPA Bands due to a failure to achieve convergence in probit models. 
Note. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering of individuals in major. All models include controls for entering cohort year, pre-ACS hours below 15 
hours, and quadratic functions of the assignment variable, centered pre-ACS GPA. All models with discrete dependent variables are estimated using linear 
probability regression models due to a failure to achieve convergence in binary probit models. 
Source. Authors’ calculations. 
 




Table 9 presents results from analyses exploring the extent to which prior ACS recipients 
experience different treatment effects than new ACS recipients.72 Specifically, the estimates in 
the first row of Table 9 describe the estimated difference between ACS recipients and non-
recipients who have not won an ACS in the past. The second row, titled “ACS Receipt & Prior 
ACS Interaction” presents the estimated ACS treatment different between new and prior ACS 
recipients. Finally, the coefficient estimates in row three represent the differences in outcomes 
between students who received the ACS in the past and those who did not among non-ACS 
recipients. 
The results presented in Table 9 provide some assurance that our primary estimates are 
not strongly confounded by the presence of prior-ACS recipients. First, the coefficients on the 
majority of interaction terms are insignificant: indicating that new- and prior-ACS recipients did 
not experience dramatically different outcomes following the expansion of the program in the 
fall of 2010. The exceptions are the models examining credit accumulation after two years and 
the two models estimating the ACS effects on the likelihood of graduation. The significant 
interactions in the latter models are less concerning because the coefficient estimates are based 
on linear probability regressions, which tend to be biased when continuous covariates are 
included in the model (Wooldridge, 2002). 73 At the same time, LPM estimation is the best 
available analytical option in these cases, as our probit estimations failed to achieve 
convergence. The significant interactions in the year two credit accumulation models are more 
concerning. Moreover, while insignificant, new ACS receivers earned fewer credit hours than 
                                                 
72 As with the analyses presented in the prior section, all models examining discrete dependent 
variables are estimated using linear probability models.  
73 Indeed, over between 24 and 33 percent of observations in the models estimating the 
likelihood of graduation within 4 years have predicted probabilities of graduating outside the 
plausible range of 0 or 1. Similarly, around 15 percent of observations are outside this range for 
the LPMs estimating the likelihood of graduating within 5 years. 




students who did not qualify for the ACS and did not receive it in the past. This finding is 
concerning for the models focusing on credit hour accumulation after two years, and we 
therefore recommend caution in interpreting these results. 
In addition, none of the estimated differences between prior and new ACS recipients (row 
3) are largely statistically significant, further highlighting the similarity of the two groups. Again, 
the exceptions to this are largely associated with linear probability regressions, which are not 
generally the preferred method for estimating effects with binary dependent variables. These 
models indicate that, among students who did not receive the ACS in fall 2010, former ACS 
recipients were slightly more likely to persist through the spring of 2011 and were less likely to 
graduate within five years. 
Finally, the results presented in Table 9 confirm the earlier finding that students who are 
predicted to receive the ACS have significantly lower final GPAs than other students. Given the 
relatively small differences in estimated effects between Table 9 and Tables 4 through 6, as well 
as the substantively small differences estimated by the interaction effects, we conclude that our 
overall effects are not strongly biased by prior ACS recipients. 
Cohort interactions. As noted earlier, our primary analyses are based on an uneven 
panel. Currently, our data do not allow us to estimate 5-year graduation for all cohorts because 
the 2009-10 cohort—who were sophomores when they could win the scholarship—could at most 
be enrolled in their fifth year at the conclusion of our data. Given the strong negative four year 
graduation rate results and the insignificant five year graduation results; there is a concern that 
the effects of the ACS on college outcomes may vary by cohort. In Table 10 we present results 
.









RD Effect Estimates Separated by Cohorts 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
  Year 1 GPA   Pr(Persist 1 Yr.)   Year 1 Credit Acc. 
ACS Recipient in '07 Cohort 
0.18 0.16  0.00 0.03  -7.96 -6.77 
(0.20) (0.20)  (0.36) (0.29)  (12.75) (12.55) 
ACS Recipient in '08 Cohort 
0.42*** 0.26*  -0.09 -0.03  -3.72 -3.32 
(0.16) (0.13)  (0.37) (0.30)  (16.84) (16.05) 
ACS Recipient in '09 Cohort 
0.03 0.01  0.07 0.17  -4.69 -2.00 
(0.08) (0.04)  (0.35) (0.27)  (14.93) (13.46) 
Cohort 2007 
-0.00 0.00  0.06 0.09**  3.31 4.03 
(0.03) (0.03)  (0.05) (0.04)  (3.11) (3.15) 
Cohort 2008 
-0.16*** -0.10**  0.12* 0.14**  1.62 2.59 
(0.05) (0.05)  (0.07) (0.06)  (2.46) (2.65) 
Controls for demo. and income  X   X   X 
N 322 321   322 321   322 321 
  Year 2 Credit Acc.   Final GPA   Pr(Grad. in 4 Yrs.) 
ACS Recipient in '07 Cohort 
   -0.25 -0.23  -1.08*** -0.95*** 
   (0.16) (0.19)  (0.34) (0.23) 
ACS Recipient in '08 Cohort 
-6.31 -8.16  -0.12 -0.22**  -0.97*** -0.87*** 
(15.06) (17.41)  (0.09) (0.10)  (0.34) (0.26) 
ACS Recipient in '09 Cohort 
-8.57 -8.45  -0.41** -0.32**  -1.10** -0.90* 
(12.99) (15.26)  (0.17) (0.13)  (0.50) (0.54) 
Cohort 2007 
   -0.10*** -0.06  0.03 0.07 
   (0.04) (0.04)  (0.18) (0.23) 
Cohort 2008 
-0.54 0.32  -0.14** -0.06  -0.04 0.01 
(2.00) (2.07)  (0.07) (0.06)  (0.14) (0.16) 
Controls for demo. and income  X   X   X 
N 251 251   322 321   322 321 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering of individuals in major. All models include controls for entering cohort year, pre-ACS hours below 15 
hours, and quadratic functions of the assignment variable, centered pre-ACS GPA. Persistence and Graduation models are estimated using LPM regressions. 





from models exploring the possibility of differential treatment effects across cohorts through a 
series of interactions. 
Specifically, we split out the receipt variable across the three cohorts. The coefficient 
estimates associated with the rows titled “Cohort 2007” and “Cohort 2008” represent the 
estimated difference between in outcomes between non-ACS recipients in the given cohorts and 
the 2009 cohort. The coefficient estimates on the interactions presented in rows one through 
three represent the estimated treatment differential for each cohort. As before, we are only able 
to present results of linear probability models for our binary outcome models due to a failure to 
achieve convergence in probit models 
For the most part, the results presented in Table 10 do not suggest that ACS treatment 
effects differed largely across cohorts. At the individual coefficient level, there is evidence that 
some relationships are driven more strongly by particular cohorts. For example, the 2008-09 
cohort may be driving the results for Year 1 GPA while the 2007-08 cohort appears to contribute 
little to the results observed for Final GPA. Nevertheless, it is important to note the great degree 
of noise present in Table 10, which is symptomatic of the small sizes of the analytical samples. 
Indeed, while some cohort-specific treatment coefficients are statistically significant, t-tests 
examining the extent to which all three coefficient estimates are the same fail to reject the null 
hypothesis across all models. Thus, in general, while the evidence presented in Table 10 suggests 
that certain cohorts may be driving our results, we are unable to support this claim with statistical 
tests due to power limitations. 
Placebo analysis. As a final check of our analytical strategy, we estimate ACS effects in 
a cohort of students who could not receive the lottery scholarship financed ACS. Specifically, we 





2005-06, and 2006-07. All students included in our analyses meet the same requirements of our 
analytical sample: they are in-state applicants who have filled out a FAFSA, have been 
continuously enrolled, meet the ACS credit hours requirement, and have cumulative GPAs 
between 2.2 and 2.8 points. In addition, we restrict the cohorts to mirror their counterparts in our 
analytical sample: the 2004-05 cohort is examined in their 7th semester, 2005-06 cohort is 
examined in their 5th semester, and the 2006-07 cohort is examined in its 3rd semester. 
The results of our placebo analysis are presented in Table 11. Because we do not have 
data on scholarship receipt, all models estimate the intent-to-treat effect of ACS qualification. In 
addition, all models are fully specified. As expected, ACS qualification is not significantly 
related to any of the seven college outcomes. More importantly, all estimated effects are 
substantively small; providing strong evidence that ACS qualification was not related to 
outcomes in these earlier cohorts. While not definitive, these findings again lend credence to our 
analysis 
Discussion 
In this paper, we examine the effect of the Arkansas Academic Challenge Scholarship—a broad-
based state-financed merit-aid scholarship—on college outcomes at a Large Arkansas University 
(LAU) by using scholarship eligibility requirements in a regression discontinuity framework. In 
general, our results indicate that currently enrolled LAU students who received the ACS did not 
earn higher cumulative GPAs and were no more likely to be enrolled after one year. On the other 
hand, ACS recipients had significantly lower final GPAs and were significantly less likely to 
graduate within four years. Nevertheless, our models indicate that ACS recipients were no less 
likely to graduate within five years than comparison group students. Taken along with the 










RD Effect Estimates for Students Entering LAU in 2004-05, 2005-06, and 2006-07 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
  Year 1 GPA   Pr(Persist 1 Year)   Year 1 Credit Acc.   Year 2 Credit Acc. 
Predicted ACS Receipt 
0.06  0.16  -0.03  0.40 
(0.05)  (1.46)  (0.12)  (2.39) 
        
N 266  255  233  217 
ACS GPA Band .30   .30   .30   .30 
        
  Final GPA   Pr(Graduate in 4 years)   Pr(Graduate in 5 years)     
Predicted ACS Receipt 
0.08  -0.03  0.12   
(0.05)  (0.12)  (0.27)   
        
N 258  260  103   
ACS GPA Band .30   .30   .30     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering of individuals in major. All models are fully specified: they include controls for student demographics, 
family finance, entering cohort year, pre-ACS hours below 15 hours, and quadratic functions of the assignment variable, centered pre-ACS GPA. To mirror the 
samples available for our primary analyses, the “Year 2 Credit Acc.” model (row 1; column 4) excludes the 2004-05 cohort and the “Pr(Graduated in 5 years)” 






ACS recipients were more likely to delay graduation. 
These findings differ from earlier RDD analyses of state-financed merit-aid programs. 
For example, Scott-Clayton finds in her 2012 examination of the West Virginia PROMISE 
scholarship that recipients earned significantly higher final GPAs, accumulated significantly 
more credit hours, and were significantly more likely to graduate within four years. While we 
would like to stress that the findings presented in this paper are preliminary, we offer two 
comments regarding our divergent findings. 
First, we are examining a substantively different student population compared to prior 
studies. Specifically, our study is focused on students who were currently enrolled in college 
when they became eligible for the ACS (as opposed to entering freshmen) meeting relatively 
weak academic credential requirements (enrolling for 12 hours a semester and earning a 
cumulative GPA of at least 2.5 points). While West Virginia’s PROMISE program is similar to 
the Arkansas ACS, it should not be unexpected to find that these different student populations 
would have different experiences. 
Second, while our results differ from other studies, it is important to note that they 
present a consistent story. Specifically, the statistically insignificant negative credit hour 
accumulation findings and evidence suggesting that ACS recipients are just as likely as non-
recipients to graduate within five years are consistent with students delaying their time to 
graduation after receiving a scholarship. While this may not be the intended impact of the ACS, 
it nevertheless helps to explain why our findings differ from other studies. 
Finally, we would like to highlight the preliminary nature of the research presented in this 





determining band width nor are all models complete. We intend to address these issues in future 
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Remaining Estimated Coefficients for Second Stage Regressions, Simple and Full Models Only 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
  Year 1 GPA   Pr(Persist 1 Year) 
Cohort 2007-08 0.06 0.07  0.02 0.03 
 (0.05) (0.07)  (0.02) (0.02) 
Cohort 2008-09 0.00 0.00  0.06*** 0.06** 
 (0.03) (0.03)  (0.02) (0.03) 
Pre-ACS hours <15 -0.01 0.01  -0.04 -0.03 
 (0.04) (0.03)  (0.08) (0.06) 
cGPA 0.44 0.39  0.01 0.10 
 (0.58) (0.80)  (0.36) (0.19) 
cGPA^2 -1.82 -1.70  1.32 1.82* 
 (2.48) (3.16)  (1.39) (1.04) 
Qualify x cGPA -0.07 -0.22  0.36 0.19 
 (1.29) (1.52)  (1.00) (0.69) 
Qualify x cGPA^2 2.62 3.27*  -1.83 -2.30 
 (1.59) (1.80)  (2.44) (2.01) 
Observations 322 321  322 321 
  One Year Credit Accumulation   Two Year Credit Accumulation 
Cohort 2007-08 1.85 1.91  --- --- 
 (1.99) (2.42)  --- --- 
Cohort 2008-09 1.92*** 1.94***  0.39 0.44 
 (0.49) (0.62)  (1.08) (1.38) 
Pre-ACS hours <15 -3.54 -2.91  -2.28 -1.56 
 (2.94) (2.45)  (1.68) (1.45) 
cGPA -11.38 -12.75  0.49 5.98 
 (27.69) (25.71)  (21.20) (19.76) 
cGPA^2 -75.49 -72.84  -63.16 -40.53 
 (93.32) (85.25)  (79.35) (61.26) 
Qualify x cGPA 40.80 36.63  21.42 14.97 
 (32.98) (28.52)  (47.28) (48.93) 
Qualify x cGPA^2 28.94 38.24  57.02 37.25 
 (150.05) (144.98)  (123.00) (151.74) 
Observations 322 321  251 251 
Student demographics X   X 
Family income   X   X 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering of individuals in major. Estimated coefficients correspond 
with the results presented in Tables 4 and 5. All models are restricted to samples within the pre-ACS GPA band of 
.30. The 2007-08 cohort is excluded from the two year credit accumulation models because this members of this 
cohort are expected to be in their fourth year of college when they could receive the expanded ACS; and are 
therefore less likely to be enrolled two years after potential receipt. 






Remaining Estimated Coefficients for Second Stage Regressions, Simple and Full Models Only 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
  Final GPA   Pr(Graduate in 4 years) 
Cohort 2007-08 -0.03 -0.02  0.01 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.05)  (0.05) (0.06) 
Cohort 2008-09 -0.02 -0.02  0.01 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.04)  (0.03) (0.02) 
Pre-ACS Hours <15 -0.08* -0.05  -0.15*** -0.14*** 
 (0.04) (0.04)  (0.03) (0.03) 
cGPA 1.95*** 1.78***  1.65*** 1.77** 
 (0.74) (0.64)  (0.48) (0.75) 
cGPA^2 3.06 2.82  4.51** 4.80 
 (3.29) (2.75)  (1.90) (3.07) 
Qualify x cGPA -0.75 -0.83  -0.08 -0.21 
 (1.67) (1.50)  (0.93) (1.03) 
Qualify x cGPA^2 -3.36 -2.51  -6.98** -7.39* 
 (3.64) (2.51)  (2.81) (4.28) 
Observations 322 321  322 321 
  Pr(Graduate in 5 years)     
Cohort 2007-08 0.08** 0.07    
 (0.04) (0.05)    
Pre-ACS Hours <15 -0.13 -0.17    
 (0.15) (0.13)    
cGPA -2.47* -0.84    
 (1.35) (1.66)    
cGPA^2 -13.37*** -7.55    
 (4.66) (6.47)    
Qualify x cGPA 1.48 -0.88    
 (2.01) (0.72)    
Qualify x cGPA^2 17.34** 13.42    
 (8.73) (11.40)    
Observations 159 158    
Student demographics  X   X 
Family income   X   X 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering of individuals in major. Estimated coefficients correspond 
with the results presented in Table 6. All models are restricted to samples within the pre-ACS GPA band of .30. 







Cash transfers are an increasingly popular policy instrument both abroad and in the 
United States. In this dissertation, I investigate how two statewide educational interventions 
using conditional cash transfer programs affected student outcomes. 
Chapter 1 presents the first experimental study of a statewide school voucher program in 
the United States: the Louisiana Scholarship Program. Unlike similar random assignment 
evaluations of school voucher programs, the effect estimates presented in Chapter 1 indicate that 
students who used the LSP scholarships to enroll in private schools experienced significant 
declines in both ELA and math achievement. These estimates are quite substantial and are robust 
to several specification checks. 
Chapter 2 also examines the experiences of students participating in the first year of the 
LSP's statewide expansion. Unlike other school voucher evaluations, which have largely focused 
on student achievement and attainment, Chapter 2 represents the first attempt to examine how 
students participating in a voucher program differ on non-cognitive skills and political tolerance 
measures from other applicants. In general, the results presented in Chapter 2 do not indicate that 
the two groups differed strongly on these measures after two years. Furthermore, while 
researchers attempting to estimate the effects of charter schools on Grit have cautioned against 
the presence of reference group bias (Dobbie & Fryer, 2014; West et al., 2014), we find little 
evidence of such bias in our estimates. 
Finally, Chapter 3 investigates the effects of a broad-based aid scholarship in Arkansas, 
the Academic Challenge Scholarship, on college outcomes for students who were currently 
enrolled in college at the time of the program's expansion. The estimates presented in Chapter 3 





students who barely missed the ACS cutoffs after one year, but had significantly lower final 
GPAs and four year graduation rates. Nevertheless, ACS recipients appear to have caught up to 
their counterparts after five years; suggesting that students receiving the ACS may use the 
additional funds to delay their graduation. 
While Chapters 1 through 3 all include several robustness checks designed to examine 
result sensitivity, it is important to consider the following caveats when interpreting these 
findings. First, it is important to recognize that the results presented in Chapter 1 are based on a 
subset of eligible LSP applicants who had baseline achievement and whose scholarship receipt 
was determined by oversubscription lotteries. These restrictions effectively limit the analysis to 
an analytical sample representing slightly less than 20 percent of eligible applicants. It is 
therefore important to recognize that the estimated results may not be indicative of the 
experiences of other students in the program. Furthermore, the estimates in Chapter 1 are based 
on little more than 6 months of program participation. Future versions of this research will 
explore if these negative effects persist as students and schools become acclimated to the 
program. 
While the estimated differences between LSP receivers and non-receivers are 
insignificant in Chapter 2, they are also particularly noisy. This is likely due to two factors: the 
scales used are validated neither for phone surveys nor for children as young as some of the 
children included in our survey sample. In addition, it is important to note that the final analytical 
sample examined in Chapter 2 represents only 10 percent of the population of eligible LSP 
applicants in the first year of the program’s expansion. As is often the case with survey-based 





Chapter 3 additionally suffers from statistical power concerns due to both the small 
sample of students with academic qualifications around the ACS cutoffs as well as the general 
power issues involved with fuzzy regression discontinuity estimations. In addition, the analysis 
presented in Chapter 3 is currently limited by an inability to estimate program effects on five 
year graduation rates for students in the 2009-10 cohort due to data limitations. Given the 
substantially large negative effects estimated for four year graduation rates, it is possible that the 
overall ACS effect may be negative when these students are included in the final analysis. This 
question will be addressed in future research once we obtain an additional year of data. 
Despite these caveats, the research presented in this dissertation makes several 
contributions to the school choice and higher education financial aid literatures. Chapter 1 
represents the first experimental evaluation of a statewide voucher program as well as the first 
such study to estimate statistically significant achievement effects. Chapter 2 is the first attempt 
by researchers to compare students participating in a school voucher program on non-cognitive 
skills and measures of political tolerance. Finally, Chapter 3 represents the first attempt to 
estimate the impact of a broad-based merit-aid scholarship with low academic qualifications on 
college outcomes for students who were currently enrolled in college at the time of scholarship 
receipt. 
On the whole, however, the most important takeaway from this research is the possibility 
of unintended, and potentially perverse, outcomes resulting from policy designs. The significant 
negative achievement effect estimates presented in Chapter 1 represent the first of their kind 
among random assignment evaluations of school voucher programs in the U.S. Moreover, the 
magnitude of the estimated effects is highly concerning. Policymakers considering voucher 





framework creates disincentives for private school participation (Kisida, Wolf, & Rhinesmith, 
2014). Similarly, the evidence presented in Chapter 3 suggesting that students currently enrolled 
in college who received the ACS may have delayed graduation may be worrisome to 
policymakers. In particular, this evidence suggests that similar programs should consider how 
students currently enrolled in college, as well as students with particularly low academic 
credentials, may be impacted by similar scholarship programs. 
Thus, while each of the analyses presented in this dissertation benefit their respective 
literatures due to the novelty of their subjects, this research is a reminder that unintended 
consequences are likely to arise in any educational intervention. This suggests a continued need 
for policymakers and researchers to work together in an effort to design, monitor, and re-design 







Dobbie, W., & Fryer, R. G. (2014). The medium-term impacts of high-achieving charter schools 
(Working Paper). 
Kisida, B., Wolf, P. J., & Rhinesmith, E. (2015). Views from private schools: Attitudes about 
school choice programs in three states. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute. 
West, M. R., Kraft, M. K., Finn, A. S., Martin, R., Duckworth, A. L., Gabrieli, C. F. O., & 
Gabrieli, J. D. E. (2014). Promise and paradox: Measuring students’ non-cognitive skills 
and the impact of schooling (Working Paper). 
  
  
139 
 
 
Appendix 
 
  
  
140 
 
 
 
